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ABSTRACT 
The National gendarmerie in Senegal, which is a hybrid military and 
law-enforcement force, is an institution inherited from colonial France. Since Senegal’s 
independence on April 4, 1960, the gendarmerie’s main role has been to ensure the security 
of Senegal’s people and their properties. The current security context in the country and 
abroad—characterized by such complex and multiform threats as terrorism and 
transnational organized crime—has prompted Senegalese policy makers to increase the 
gendarmerie’s current role in fighting these types of security dangers. 
Nevertheless, neither the Gendarmerie nor its intelligence services are properly 
designed to fulfill this role effectively, due to the lack of adequate structures and too few 
trained personnel. The gendarmerie also lacks units specialized in intelligence 
analysis—except for the documentation division. Against the background of these 
shortcomings, and faced with the persistent security crisis in neighboring Mali, Senegal is 
seeking to overhaul its intelligence services, so as to respond more effectively to such 
threats while also preserving the standards of democracy. 
Based on a review of the relevant literature and a comparison study of reforms in 
the French National Gendarmerie, this thesis recommends steps to ensure successful reform 
of the Senegalese gendarmerie intelligence services. 
v 
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The National Gendarmerie of Senegal, which is a hybrid military and law-
enforcement force, is an institution inherited from colonial France.1 Since Senegal’s 
independence on April 4, 1960, the gendarmerie’s main role has been to ensure the 
security of Senegal’s people and their property.2 The current security context in the 
country and abroad—characterized by such complex and multiform threats as terrorism 
and transnational organized crime—has prompted Senegalese policy makers to increase 
the gendarmerie’s current role in fighting these types of security dangers.  
Nevertheless, neither the gendarmerie nor its intelligence services3 are properly 
designed to fulfill this role effectively due to the lack of adequate structures and trained 
personnel.4 For instance, as threats have evolved, the gendarmerie’s intelligence units 
have failed to develop adequate collection techniques (e.g., interception, imagery) or 
specialists (e.g., particularly in the human intelligence and imagery disciplines). The 
gendarmerie also lacks units specialized in intelligence analysis—except for the 
documentation division, which is comprised of 40 employees who serve to centralize and 
analyze intelligence received from all gendarmerie units and disseminate it to authorities 
including the President, as well as concerned ministries. Even within this documentation 
division, however, most of the agents still lack adequate analysis-related training. In 
addition, they practice intelligence in an informal way; the division lacks any formal 
standard procedures, including, for example, source handling, clandestine operations, and 
risk management. 
                                                 
1 “La Conférence De Berlin Livre Le Congo Au Roi Des Belges,” [Berlin Conference grants Congo to 
Belgian King] Herodote.net, August 1, 2016. https://www.herodote.net/26_fevrier_1885-evenement-
18850226.php. 
2 Sidy Sady, La Gendarmerie Nationale Sénégalaise : Son Rôle dans la Consolidation de l’État. [The 
National Gendarmerie of Senegal: Its Role in the Consolidation of the State] (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 
2011). 
3 The Senegalese Gendarmerie’s intelligence services include the documentation division, the 
territorial division, and mobile units, which conduct informal intelligence missions. 




All of these limitations have resulted in certain intelligence failures. Most notable 
among these failures was the clash between Malian and Burkinabe communities in the 
gold village of Diyabougou in the Bakel department in 2013, which resulted in six dead 
and many wounded.5 If the gendarmerie had had human intelligence units assigned to 
each village, the nascent threat could have been anticipated and prevented. 
Against the background of these shortcomings, and faced with the persistent 
security crisis in neighboring Mali,6 Senegal is seeking to overhaul its intelligence 
services, so as to respond more effectively to such threats as civil violence, Islamist 
radicalization, and the separatist movement in the South of the country—all while also 
preserving the standards of democracy. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the Senegalese gendarmerie transform its intelligence services to 
increase their effectiveness while also remaining democratically accountable? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis is relevant to the literature of intelligence and democracy in that it 
provides insights into intelligence reform in a region that is understudied—Africa. It is 
relevant to the policy makers in Senegal because it provides them with an assessment of 
the current capabilities of the gendarmerie’s intelligence services and its place in the 
overall Senegalese intelligence community. Furthermore, it provides them with 
                                                 
5 “Tuerie de Diyabougou à Bakel entre Maliens et Burkinabe: Deux Corps Burkinabés Inhumés à 
Diyabougou, Huit Autres En Attente,” [Killing of Diyabougou in Bakel between Malians and Burkinabe: 
Two bodies buried in Diyabougou, Eight Others Waiting] Seneweb News, accessed March 27, 2018, 
http://www.seneweb.com/news/Sécurité/tuerie-de-diyabougou-a-bakel-enter-maliens-et-burkinabe-deux-
corps-burkinabes-inhumes-a-diyabougou-huit-autres-en-attente_n_90505.html. 
6 In 2012, Mali, a country neighboring Senegal, experienced an unprecedented security crisis. The 
MNLA, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, an independent armed group, attacked the 
garrison of Menaka, a town in northern Mali, 1,200 kilometers from Bamako, causing many deaths in the 
ranks of the Malian army. A generalized conquest of North Mali by the MNLA began then. At the same 
time, a coup d’état took place, led by Captain Amadou Aya Sanogo, who ordered the army to withdraw 
from the North. Jihadist armed groups such as Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb) took advantage of the situation and seized almost all cities in the North and started to advance to 
the capital Bamako. For further readings, see: Olivier Rogez, “2012, Année Chaotique Pour Le Mali - 




recommendations for reforms that the civilian elites in Senegal must undertake to achieve 
effectiveness and transparency of the gendarmerie’s intelligence agencies.  
This thesis also aspires to improve the image of Senegal in the African region and 
the world. As many African countries are facing human-rights issues, implementing new 
mechanisms of democratic control of intelligence activities will consolidate the power of 
the ruling leader of Senegal in terms of respect for human rights and democracy. 
Finally, this thesis is relevant to the U.S. government because it provides 
background on the tradeoff between transparency and intelligence in Senegal, a U.S. 
strategic partner in Africa. If Senegal’s intelligence activities are performed 
professionally and under appropriate democratic civilian control, Senegal’s allies can 
have more confidence in intelligence sharing. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although the literary works dealing with the intelligence function are fairly 
consistent, those related to the relationship among intelligence, democracy, and 
effectiveness are quite limited. As far as the Senegalese gendarmerie is concerned, the 
literature is almost nonexistent. Few articles or books deal with the Senegalese 
gendarmerie. Thus, this literature review focuses on the intelligence function in a 
democracy as well as the reform of this function so that it is democratically controlled 
and effective. Because this thesis includes a comparative study of the French 
Gendarmerie, the works related to the relations between intelligence and law enforcement 
are also discussed in the last part of this literature review. 
1. On Intelligence Effectiveness in a Democracy 
Although defining intelligence exactly appears to be difficult, some scholars 
attempt to highlight the role of effective intelligence in a democracy. Mark M. 
Lowenthal, for one, argues that in a democracy, intelligence plays a major role in 
supporting policy making.7  
                                                 
7 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 1–9. 
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Building on Lowenthal’s definition of intelligence, Thomas C. Bruneau and 
Florina Cristiana Matei highlight that  
intelligence is a three-tiered element of national security. It is a Process by 
which certain types of information (e.g., security threats, strategic threat 
estimates, future capabilities projections, indication and warning) are 
required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated to decision/
policymakers, and by which certain types of covert action are conceived 
and conducted; an organization, with units that execute the intelligence 
functions (process and product); and a Product of these processes and 
organizations (e.g., analyses, intelligence estimates).8  
They further note that all these aspects of intelligence aim at supporting the policy 
process and ongoing operations, as well as other security institutions.9 In agreement with 
Lowenthal, Matei and Bruneau maintain that intelligence simultaneously involves 
information and response.10 In the same vein, Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski 
emphasize the role of intelligence in a democracy, namely “to determine the capabilities 
and intentions of a nation’s adversaries, and warn of potential threats.”11 On the same 
note, Michael Hermann states that 
governments want “security” (information security) over a wide range of 
matters. Thus, the country’s internal security includes information security 
measures to frustrate foreign espionage, and external security includes 
similar measures to protect military and diplomatic communications 
against foreign interception and exploitation. But some things outside any 
reasonable definition of the national security area also need information 
security protection, for example sensitive economic and financial 
information or even confidential information about individuals.12  
                                                 
8 Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New 
Democracies,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 24, no. 4 (2011): 658. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2011.598784. 
9 Matei and Bruneau, 659. 
10 Matei and Bruneau, 660–661. 
11 Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski. “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of 
Control in New Democracies,” Center for Civil-Military Relations (2014): 2, Calhoun, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41971. 
12 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 165. 
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Hermann’s statement hence confirms the centrality of intelligence in a state’s 
functioning and security. Finally, Matei provides a detailed demonstration of the 
importance of effective intelligence in a democracy, while also stressing the need for 
accountability and transparency.13 In this context, she notes that “intelligence systems are 
a vital component of the state security as the state entrusts them, on the one hand, with 
the diagnosis of dangers and threats to national security and, on the other hand, with the 
prevention of the transformation of these threats into disasters (even if this means 
engaging in clandestine activities or exploiting secret sources and methods).”14  
2. On Intelligence Reform in a Democracy 
A different body of literature addresses the concept of intelligence reform in a 
democracy. Timothy Edmunds, for one, lays out the necessary steps developing 
democracies must undertake to achieve democratic reform of their intelligence policies 
and agencies.15 In his view, democratization of intelligence implies several necessary 
steps. Edmunds asserts that 
The first of these concerns establishing the principle and practice of 
civilian control over the intelligence agencies. The second involves 
consolidating the democratic nature of this control through the 
establishment of mechanisms for oversight and scrutiny of the 
agencies’ activities, and developing relevant expertise and capacities 
to support these activities. The final level concerns organisational 
reform in the agencies themselves, reorientating and reorganising for 
their new roles, and eliminating the most corrosive legacies of the 
past.16  
Likewise, Bruneau and Matei argue that democratic reform of the intelligence 
apparatus should involve the following: the creation of new agencies (reforming 
personnel and organization); the establishment of legal framework for intelligence that 
                                                 
13 Florina Cristiana Matei, “A Plea for Effective Intelligence in a Democracy: The View of an 
Outsider,” in A War of Mind. Intelligence, Intelligence Services and Strategic Knowledge in the 21st 
Century, ed. George Christian Maior (Bucharest: RAO Publishing, 2010). 
14 Matei, 289. 
15 Timothy Edmunds, “Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in Serbia 
after Milošević,” Europe-Asia Studies, 60, no. 1 (2008): https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701760315. 
16 Edmunds, 30. 
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provides for clear roles and missions for intelligence agencies, as well as oversight; 
interagency coordination and cooperation; and the establishment of democratic control 
mechanisms over the intelligence agencies, such as executive, legislative, internal, and 
informal.17 Interestingly, Bruneau and Matei particularly stress that democratic control 
mechanisms are key in crafting effective intelligence agencies in a democracy.18 Matei 
and Bruneau also emphasize the importance of the professionalization of intelligence 
agencies in achieving intelligence effectiveness in a democracy:  
of particular importance, has been the professionalization of the 
intelligence agencies (expertise, corporateness, and responsibility), which 
the developing democracies have strived to accomplish through various 
education and training programs for intelligence personnel, security 
clearance to access classified information, as well as instilling a 
responsibility for democracy.19  
As presented in their article, professional and focused training is mandatory for an 
effective reform of intelligence services. In the case of the Senegalese gendarmerie 
reform, recruitment and adequate training will be one of the pillars supporting 
effectiveness, as many gendarmes make professional mistakes because of their lack of 
training in special domains (infiltration, analysis, etc.). 
If Edmunds insists on the necessity to reform intelligence in new democracies in 
order to achieve civilian control of intelligence activities, Marina Caparini, for one, 
discusses the tradeoff between intelligence oversight and effectiveness. She states that  
in a liberal democratic state, security intelligence must exist ‘within the 
context of respect for civil rights, free speech, the rule of law, checks and 
balances or other values held to be important by society’. The quest of 
intelligence control and oversight in the democratic state, then, is to enable 
agencies to produce effective security intelligence while ensuring that they 
                                                 
17 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The 
Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, ed. 
Loch K. Johnson (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 761–770. 
18 Bruneau and Matei, 764–768. 
19 Bruneau and Matei, 768. 
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operate within the law and in a way that is consistent with democratic 
norms and standards.20  
Caparini also discusses the two primary aims of implementing intelligence 
oversight in a democracy. The first goal of intelligence oversight seeks to determine the 
efficacy of intelligence services, their capacity to successfully execute their missions, and 
the efficiency with which they use the funds that are provided to them. Secondly, the 
oversight may determine whether intelligence services are acting in accordance with the 
law, in the respect to civils rights and ethical norms.21  
Fred Schreir, too, notes the need for a tradeoff between efficient and legitimate 
intelligence in a democracy. He explains the role and functioning of intelligences services 
in a democracy, which is to inform government by collecting information, evaluating it, 
transforming it into intelligence, and disseminating it, including “risk estimates, situation 
reports, and assessments according to the needs of the national government.”22 Then, he 
discusses the democratic control of intelligence services that have to be free of any 
political affiliation. This democratic control should be exercised by the executive power 
(clear tasking system controlled by the government), the legislative power (Parliamentary 
oversight committee), the judiciary power (establishment of legal framework), and by the 
public itself. (Supervision of intelligence activities by civil society organizations, non-
governmental organizations, political parties, etc.).23 Schreir concludes by stating that  
more efficiency can only be achieved if the role and function of 
intelligence is understood by the state’s institutions and the public, and if 
intelligence is used to its best effect by the government. In this respect, a 
greater legitimacy of intelligence is needed to gain more respect and trust 
from the general public and representatives and to make intelligence a 
permanent part of the nation-state. In this regard, it is necessary to make 
national interest and the prevention of risks and dangers the raison d’être 
                                                 
20 Marina Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States” in 
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, ed. Hans Born, and Marina 
Caparini (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007), 4. 
21 Caparini, 9. 
22 Fred Schreier, “The Need for Efficient and Legitimate Intelligence,” in Democratic Control of 
Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, ed. Hans Born and Marina Caparini (Aldershot, 
England: Ashgate, 2007), 31. 
23 Schreier, 38–44. 
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of the intelligence services and to enable more international intelligence 
exchange and sharing, which is a necessity for the international 
community since international action is no more cohesive than the 
intelligence assessments that underlie it.24  
In the case of Senegal, intelligence services’ activities are rarely discussed. At 
some point, it is evident that the intelligence community in the Senegalese state is 
ignored by many citizens due to the heritage of the post-colonial period, where 
intelligence services were used as political instruments. 
Caparini explains the framework and accountability of security and intelligence 
using Schedler’s tripartite approach to accountability.25 First, there is horizontal 
accountability. In this type of control, institutions of the same body control each other. 
This control can only be exercised, however, if the notion of separation of power is 
effective since the legislative, the judicial, the executive powers, other state institutions, 
and public agencies interact in terms of control.26 Then, the second type is vertical 
accountability. Unlike horizontal control, vertical control relates to unequal entities in 
terms of power, such as decision makers and the public. In a democracy, every citizen has 
the right to know how the country is ruled and how his or her tax money is used. In terms 
of intelligence, civil society organizations and the media play a key role in vertical 
accountability.27 Finally, there is third dimension accountability. The third dimension, 
control, includes the participation of international actors (foreign governments), 
intergovernmental organizations, etc. The influence of these international actors helps the 
domestic agents of control to guide decision makers in shaping better control mechanisms 
for the intelligence services.28 However, as Caparini observes, “the biggest obstacle to 
the effectiveness of the third dimension actors on state security and intelligence agencies 
is the sovereignty of the nation-state, which in most circumstances enables them to ignore 
                                                 
24 Schreier, “The Need for Efficient and Legitimate Intelligence,” 44. 
25 Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States,” 10–17. 
26 Marina Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States” in 
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, ed. Hans Born and Marina 
Caparini (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007), 10–17. 




pressures or censure from abroad if it so chooses.”29 Schedler’s concept30 closely 
matches the criteria of accountability and transparency required by and of democracy.  
3. On Challenges and Best Practices of Intelligence Reform in a 
Democracy 
Schreier highlights the challenge of reforming and overseeing intelligence in a 
democracy, due to the secrecy inherent in their day-to-day activities. In this connection, 
he notes,  
compared with other institutions of government, intelligence services pose 
unique difficulties for control and accountability given that they cannot 
disclose their activities to the public without disclosing them to their 
targets at the same time. As a result, intelligence services are neither 
subject to the same rigors of public and parliamentary debate nor to the 
same scrutiny by the media as other institutions of the government. Their 
budgets are secret; their activities are secret; and their products and 
achievements are secret.31  
Like Schreier, Edmunds also believes that intelligence services possess 
capabilities and knowledge that make them dangerous and difficult to reform.32 As he 
states, intelligence agencies  
may have routine access to privileged or sensitive surveillance information 
for example, or even personnel who are trained or experienced in 
assassination techniques. These capacities have the potential to frustrate or 
influence the reform process in a number of ways. Political opponents can 
be blackmailed, intimidated or simply deterred from pursuing certain 
policies for fear of the consequences, or on occasion they might even be 
murdered. These interventions or even potential interventionscan shape 
or constrain the domestic political agenda in ways that are not always 
clearly visible from the outside.33  
                                                 
29 Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States,” 16. 
30 Caparini, 10–17. 
31 Schreier, “The Need for Efficient and Legitimate Intelligence,” 26. 
32 Edmunds, “Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in Serbia after 
Milošević,” 26. 
33 Edmunds, 26–27. 
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In the same context, Matei and Bruneau highlight the difficulty new democracies 
face when attempting to reform their intelligence agencies—i.e., to bring them under 
democratic civilian control while maintaining operational effectiveness.34 They find 
intelligence reform itself complex (“painstaking processes, lack of institutions and 
resources, competing priorities”), which entails the legacy of past authoritarian practices, 
the intelligence services resistance to change, the lack of civilian expertise in the 
intelligence domain, the absence of public support for intelligence or the inexistence of 
intelligence culture, and the corruption problem.35  
Bruneau and Matei stress the legacy of the past—abuses, violations of human 
rights, special privileges—that makes finding a balance between intelligence 
effectiveness and transparency “extremely difficult” for new democracies.36 Edmunds 
makes the same analysis. He argues that the special character of intelligence agencies 
makes them difficult to reform given the resources they had in their possession, making 
authorities doubtful about implementing their reform. Then, he raises the question of the 
legacy of the old regimes that were using the intelligence apparatus as political weapon, 
and tied it to the executive branch.37 Finally, he exposes a key challenge represented by 
the lack of civilian expertise, asserting: 
More widely, if democratic oversight of the intelligence agencies is to 
function in practice, then civilians need to be in a position to actually be 
able to exercise their de jure powers and responsibilities in a meaningful 
and effective way. A key requirement for this is the development of an 
adequate degree of civilian expertise in defense and security issues.38  
                                                 
34 Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors 
Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization, 18, no. 3 (2011): https://doi.org/10.1080/
13510347.2011.586257. 
35 Matei and Bruneau, 607–615. 
36 Matei and Bruneau, 609. 
37 Timothy Edmunds, “Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in Serbia 
after Milošević,” Europe-Asia Studies, 60, no. 1 (2008): 26–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09668130701760315. 
38 Edmunds, 29. 
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Larry L. Watts, too, notes the difficulty of creating an intelligence system that is 
free from past authoritarian practices.39 Using Romania as an example he argues that the 
justice system’s lack of power to enforce laws and constitutional provisions is the most 
significant obstacle to achieving intelligence transparency and effectiveness in a 
democracy, as well as a generator of other intelligence reform challenges.40  
Moreover, Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski identify the legacy of past 
authoritarian regime practices (impunity, independence, unaccountability, political ties) 
as the most important obstacle for intelligence reform.41 Hence, they provide three 
principal practices that lead to a successful democratic reform of intelligence services in a 
state. First, the executive (the president or prime minister) needs to manage intelligence 
functions (collection, analysis, counter intelligence, and covert actions) by prioritizing 
funding based on the immediate needs of the state. Then, the role of the military in the 
intelligence apparatus should be redefined by involving more civilians at the strategic 
level of intelligence leadership. Finally, decision makers of new democracies should 
reorganize the coordination of intelligence by appointing a director of intelligence, 
responsible for coordinating all intelligence activities.42 Nonetheless, to guarantee the 
appointee’s independence and ability to remain objective, the director of intelligence 
should not by tied to the policy-making branch.43 Caparini argues that intelligence should 
be free from policy makers’ preferences and should avoid providing them intelligence 
that confirms their preferred options.44  
                                                 
39 Larry L. Watts, “Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania,” in Democratic 
Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, ed. Hans Born and Marina Caparini. 
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007). 
40 Watts, 64. 
41 Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of 
Control in New Democracies,” 7–8. 
42 Bruneau and Dombroski, 14–16. 
43 Bruneau and Dombroski, 15–16.. 
44 Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States” 7–8. 
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In addition, Edmunds outlines a complete series of practices for successful 
intelligence reform in a democracy. These practices take into account almost every point 
discussed by the other scholars. He argues that  
democratisation in the intelligence sector thus entails reform at three inter-
related levels. The first of these concerns establishing the principle and 
practice of civilian control over the intelligence agencies. The second 
involves consolidating the democratic nature of this control through the 
establishment of mechanisms for oversight and scrutiny of the agencies 
activities, and developing relevant expertise and capacities to support 
these activities. The final level concerns organisational reform in the 
agencies themselves, reorienting and reorganizing for their new roles, and 
eliminating the most corrosives legacies of the past.45  
Finally, Matei and Bruneau highlight the catalysts for intelligence reform in new 
democracies. These factors that boost progress are, in their view: the desire and readiness 
of decision makers to democratically reform intelligence, foreign implications and 
assistance, involvement of civil society and the media, and the “increased perception of 
the emerging threats of terrorism and organized crime.”46 In particular, these authors 
view the foreign implications and the desire of the decision makers as essential for a 
successful democratic reform of the gendarmerie intelligence services. 
4. On Intelligence and Law Enforcement 
Another body of literature involves law enforcement and intelligence. Olivier 
Chopin and Benjamin Oudet identify three major types of intelligence services:  
 Foreign intelligence, which is often assimilated to strategic intelligence, 
operates overseas in order to prevent any threat coming outside of the 
state. Foreign intelligence can use disruptive methods and covert actions 
to fulfill its objectives. 
 Domestic intelligence focuses on internal threats. Law enforcement 
participates actively in this type of intelligence. 
                                                 
45 Edmunds, “Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation,” 30. 
46 Matei and Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies,” 615–624. 
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 Military intelligence is charged with producing intelligence related to 
military issues. Military intelligence provides military options and military 
advice for the success of military operations of the state.47  
Chopin and Oudet describe a threefold logic underlying domestic intelligence: a 
classic logic of intelligence turned toward the interior of the national space; a police logic 
(intelligence activities being part of the policeman’s work); and a judicial logic. Because 
hostile acts detected by the intelligence service are likely to be qualified as crimes and 
offenses, they are normally intended to be transmitted to justice.48 Fred Schreier details 
the missions of domestic intelligence, which consist of collecting, analyzing, and 
producing intelligence related to the security of the state.49 These missions include 
uncovering terrorism; espionage; sabotage; subversion; political, 
ethnic and religious extremism; organised crime, narcotics production 
and trafficking; money faking and laundering; proliferation of WMD 
[weapons of mass destruction]; illegal arms dealing; arms, human, 
contraband and other smuggling; illegal immigration; electronic and 
cyberattacks, hacking and data theft; and dissemination of 
pornography, etc.50  
Thus, the role of law enforcement in intelligence encompasses criminal intelligence 
(internal or international), counter intelligence, and countering terrorism.  
With the development of the terrorist threat, police forces play fully their role in 
domestic intelligence. Steve Hewitt emphasizes the role of intelligence and law 
enforcement in addressing domestic terrorism. He argues that to deal with terrorism, 
states need to elaborate a nuanced, unified, and intelligent counterterrorism response. In 
                                                 
47 Olivier Chopin and Benjamin Oudet, Renseignement et Sécurité (Malakoff, Paris: Armand Colin, 
2016), 138–149. 
48 Chopin and Oudet, 143–147. 
49 Fred Scheier, “Fighting The Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-Led operations” (Geneva: 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009), 52, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/
default/files/publications/documents/OP16_SCF_Fighting%2520the%2520Pre-eminent%2520threats.pdf. 
50 Scheier, 52-53. 
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this response, police forces and intelligence services will play a crucial role in domestic 
intelligence, the security of populations, and threat prevention.51  
Jeremy G. Carter and David L. Carter define the mission of law enforcement 
intelligence. According to them, this mission is to  
prevent or mitigate crimes/threats/attacks from reaching fruition. This 
mission requires, or assumes, certain knowledge to be available to law 
enforcement—such as information on the criminal actors along with their 
motives, methods and targets. Without this information the probability of 
law enforcement successfully preventing crimes and terrorism 
diminishes.52  
Owing to the proximity of law enforcement and local populations, law enforcement can 
have broad access to a large network of human intelligence (HUMINT).  
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The first hypothesis considered in this thesis is that Senegal needs an assessment 
of the current state of the gendarmerie’s intelligence services. The gendarmerie has so far 
not carried out major reorganization in the field of intelligence, as it is struggling to 
position itself well within the intelligence community. 
Second, Senegal’s gendarmerie’s intelligence services need a thorough 
reorganization. In particular, this reorganization should begin with the establishment of 
specialized units exclusively in intelligence gathering and analysis. Also, this 
reorganization should take into account the tradeoff between intelligence effectiveness 
and transparency. Indeed, the democratic aspirations of our country should go hand in 
hand with the practices of our intelligence services. Thus, I hypothesize that Senegal 
must establish control mechanisms over the activities of the intelligence services of the 
gendarmerie. Such a control mechanism would be a bureau of supervision of activities of 
intelligence services (search operations, call record requests, etc.), which would be under 
                                                 
51 Steve Hewitt, The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism on the Home Front 
Since 9/11 (London: Continuum, 2011), 4. 
52 Jeremy G. Carter and David L. Carter, “Law Enforcement Intelligence: Implications for Self-




the supervision of the commander of the Internal Inspection of the Gendarmerie to allow 
the institution to remain democratically accountable and transparent while operationally 
effective. Moreover, there should be a legal framework for the gendarmerie, clearly 
defining the role of the intelligence units and including a control and oversight 
mechanism (legislative committee). 
Finally, given the small number of intelligence specialists in the gendarmerie, I 
posit that Senegal needs a more robust career path for potential intelligence professionals 
to include better recruitment, promotion, education, and training. Many instances of 
misconduct can result from lack of education/training or inappropriate training. By 
targeting appropriate and necessary education and training, the gendarmerie will be able 
to set up competent intelligence services capable of effectively fulfilling their missions. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis assesses the state of the gendarmerie’s intelligence services in order to 
identify shortcomings and other areas for improvement. By identifying the weak points as 
well as the strengths of the intelligence services, I can formulate the right combinations 
for a recommended reform in line with the new security requirements.  
This thesis mainly centers on a review and analysis of relevant literature, based on 
relevant information collected from books and articles by scholars, and reports produced 
by national and international institutions, on the reform of intelligence services in 
different countries. The study focuses particularly on the reforms and organizations of the 
intelligence services of the French gendarmerie.  
Therefore, this work’s analysis and proposed solutions to the problem are 
articulated in two parts. In the first part, this research focuses on the organization of the 
intelligence services of the French gendarmerie as well as its diverse changes over the 
past years. The second and last part is devoted to the study of the adequacy of the 
different solutions found through a comparative study of the intelligence services of the 
French and Senegalese gendarmeries while taking into account the transparency and 
accountability aspect for a better efficiency. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The first chapter of this thesis introduces the problem, research question, literature 
review, and hypotheses. 
The second chapter provides an overview of the gendarmerie’s intelligence services 
in Senegal. 
The third chapter provides a comparative study of the intelligence services of the 
French gendarmerie. This study includes its history, the various reforms it has known, as 
well as its advantages and disadvantages.  
The fourth and final chapter—analysis and recommendations—answers the 
research question, tests the hypotheses, provides the main findings and proposes 
recommendations in order to lead an effective reform of the services of the gendarmerie. 
The reform of the services of the gendarmerie will have to undertake the establishment of 
new units specializing in intelligence and effectively distributed throughout the national 
territory. This measure will allow the gendarmerie to perform better in terms of intelligence 
and reposition itself within the intelligence community. This reform should take into 
account the accountability and transparency aspect, which should serve as a basis for future 
prospects for transparency and accountability in the field of intelligence at the national 
level. 
Prior to any reform effort starting in earnest, a complete assessment of the state of 
the Senegalese gendarmerie’s intelligence services is carried out. This assessment is to 
determine the shortcomings and other areas for improvement. After this evaluation, the 
comparative study of the information services of the French gendarmerie allows me to 




II. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE 
SENEGALESE GENDARMERIE 
Since its creation in 1960,53 the Senegalese National Gendarmerie has carried out 
intelligence roles. Its categorization as a service having intelligence responsibility as a 
complementary mission, however, denotes a certain failure. This failure could be 
explained by the fact that the National Gendarmerie has not been especially focused on 
intelligence. By that, I mean that the gendarmerie did not provide its personnel with 
adequate training in intelligence. This fact is felt most often at the level of gendarmerie 
brigades which, through their fact sheets, do not apply the intelligence cycle. The fact 
sheets sent at the level of the documentation division come in the form of raw data. Even 
if intelligence staff is recruited according to well defined criteria (morality, integrity, 
loyalty, operability, capacity for discretion, analysis and adaptation, etc.), the intelligence 
functions at the level of the gendarmerie needs to improve. Moreover, the lack of 
specialization among the personnel of the gendarmerie constitutes a significant obstacle.  
Indeed, of all the personnel of the gendarmerie, few are specialized in 
intelligence. At the noncommissioned officer level, there are about 20 intelligence 
specialists (personnel who have received the appropriate training and whose dominant 
career is intelligence). At the officer level, fewer than ten intelligence specialists exist. 
Even if they have received the appropriate training to specialize in intelligence, their 
performance is affected by the fact that they are not used exclusively in intelligence units. 
They are mostly serving in the other gendarmerie units. 
This chapter provides an overview of the organization and function of the 
intelligence services of the Senegalese National Gendarmerie, its role and place within 
the intelligence community, and its strengths and weaknesses. This chapter also assesses 
the control and oversight of the gendarmerie’s intelligence services as well as their 
effectiveness. 
                                                 
53 Sady, La Gendarmerie. 
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A. OVERVIEW OF THE SENEGALESE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE 
Regulated by Law 70–23 of June 6, 1970, on the general organization of the 
national defense, the Senegalese armed forces are composed of the National 
Gendarmerie, the military (including the army, navy, and air force), and the National Fire 
Brigade. The organization and functioning of the National Gendarmerie of Senegal is 
regulated by Decree 74–571 of June 13, 1974,54 which established the main roles and 
missions of the service. Specifically, the law stipulates that the gendarmerie ensures the 
enforcement of laws and regulations, the maintenance of order and public security, 
establishes infractions, and investigates and defends the perpetrators before the courts. 
The articles 6, 8, and 125 of Decree 74–571 organize the intelligence missions assigned 
to the gendarmerie: general surveillance mostly based on HUMINT, intelligence sharing 
with other administrative services, and dissemination of intelligence to all ministries 
concerned. The gendarmerie also participates in the operational defense of the territory, 
such as securing borders and protecting critical installations, and military operations 
alongside the armed forces.55  
The gendarmerie consists of conventional and special units. Among the 
conventional units are the territorial gendarmerie units (Administrative police and judicial 
police) and the mobile units (law enforcement and operational defense of the territory). 
The gendarmerie also includes special units, including the documentation division 
(intelligence and surveillance); the research section56 (judicial and scientific Police); the 
National Gendarmerie Intervention Group (GIGN) (a special intervention unit); and the 
cyno group (a canine intervention unit).57 
                                                 
54 Léopold S. Senghor, Décret No. 74–571, “Règlement sur l’Emploi et le Service de la 
Gendarmerie,” [Regulation on the Employment and Service of the Gendarmerie] Journal Officiel de la 
République du Sénégal (1974). 
55 Senghor. 
56 Abdoulaye Wade, Décret No. 2001–312, “Création de la Section de Recherches,” [Creation of the 
Research Section] Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal (2001). 
57 Abdoulaye Wade, Décret No. 2006–112, “Organisationdu Haut Commandement de la Gendarmerie 
Nationale, ainsi que des Attributions des Autorités de Commandement” [Organization of the High 
Command of the National Gendarmerie, as well as the Attributions of the Command Authorities] (2006); 




In addition, the gendarmerie includes mobile intervention units called squadrons 
of surveillance and intervention (ESI). ESIs are deployed to Senegal’s borders and their 
main mission is surveillance and counterterrorism.58 The gendarmerie also includes an 
aerial section, which includes light aircraft type ULM (Ultra-Léger Motorisé), to 
strengthen surveillance by the air dimension. Finally, the gendarmerie has mobile 
brigades equipped with X-ray scanners to scan vehicles for hidden objects at the borders 
and within the national territory, depending on the level of alerts or particular requests 
from territorial gendarmerie units. On a daily basis, however, their mission consists of 
controlling random vehicles59 at the borders or at particular crossroads in the country,60 
according to the Penal Procedure Code and the Traffic Code. All these units, at their 
respective levels, participate in the intelligence missions of the gendarmerie. 
As part of the Armed Forces of Senegal, the National Gendarmerie is under the 
Ministry of Armed Forces. It is in charge of the military police within each service 
branch (inside the country or overseas). The High Commander of the Gendarmerie has 
the same responsibilities and privileges as the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services vis à 
vis the National Gendarmerie. He is also the Director of Military Justice. The National 
Gendarmerie also actively participates in intelligence missions within the Senegalese 
intelligence community.  
B. THE SENEGALESE GENDARMERIE’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
The National Gendarmerie intelligence services complement the work of the 
intelligence services of the Ministry of the Interior and other services, as depicted in 
Figure 1, under the direction of the General Delegation for National Intelligence (DRN). 
                                                 
58 Gendarmerie Nationale, Directive portant Emploi des Escadrons de Surveillance et d’Intervention, 
[Employment Directive of the Surveillance and Intervention Squadrons] No. 2285 /2/HC/EM/OPS/DAS 
(Dakar: Government of the Republic of Senegal, 2012). 
59 In Senegal, the police and the gendarmerie have the right to stop and control vehicles randomly. It 
is at the discretion of the officer to choose to control a vehicle or not. Also, any individual can be asked to 
show to the officer his I.D. For more information, see: Articles 14 and 16, Livre Premier, Titre Premier, 
Code de Procédure Pénal du Sénégal and Article 107, Titre 5, Chapitre Premier, Code de la Route du 
Sénégal. 
60 Arfang Saloum Sane, “La Gendarmerie Sénégalaise Dotée D’Unités De Scanner Mobiles,” [The 





Figure 1.  Senegalese Defense Organizational Chart 
As detailed in Articles 8 and 125 of Decree 74–571, the gendarmerie exercises the 
intelligence mission for the authorities; specifically, they collect, exploit, analyze, and 
disseminate the intelligence to concerned authorities. For example, the units of the 
Territorial Gendarmerie regularly elaborate reports that they transmit to the 
documentation division of the National Gendarmerie. Nonetheless, any other 
gendarmerie unit in possession of information or intelligence may prepare a report for the 
documentation division for further action. In sum, every gendarmerie unit participates in 
intelligence missions. Whether they collect raw information or finished intelligence, units 
are responsible for transmitting it to the documentation division, which is charged to 
disseminate it to authorities after exploitation and analysis. 
The documentation division (DIVDOC) has the exclusive mission of research, 
collection, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. It is part of the 
Employment / Operations chain of command of the High Command headquarters of the 
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National Gendarmerie. In accordance with the provisions of Ministerial Order No. 2075 
MFA-DIRCEL dated April 27, 2005, the DIVDOC’s missions are to assist the High 
Commandant of the National Gendarmerie in the search and detection of propaganda 
such as misinformation campaigns, and terrorist propaganda and other similar activities 
that can harm the National Defense and state security; to orient the units of the 
Gendarmerie in the search for intelligence; to collaborate, under the authority of the High 
Commander of the National Gendarmerie, with the other State agencies specializing in 
the field of intelligence; to ensure the centralization, exploitation, analysis, synthesis and 
transmission of the information collected by the units; assist the High Commander of the 
National Gendarmerie in his mission to protect the personnel, documents, equipment and 
establishments of the Gendarmerie against interferences and subversive actions; to 
maintain the documents relating to the protection of secrecy, the listing of information 
and the number; develop safety guidelines and instruct intelligence personnel; to prevent 
and investigate activities that may affect documents, materials and establishments related 
to the different levels of the Command; to ensure the technical links with the other 
intelligence services and collect from them the information useful to the Gendarmerie.61  
The DIVDOC includes the Office of Collection, which collects intelligence from 
open sources, HUMINT, and other reports transmitted by other gendarmerie units, 
particularly the Territorial Gendarmerie; and an Office of Analysis, which is charged to 
exploit, analyze, and disseminate intelligence gathered from the Office of Collection.62  
In 2014, Decree No. 2014–1244 / PR of November 29 stipulated the creation of 
an intelligence community in Senegal. The decree stipulated that the Senegalese 
intelligence community is comprised of dedicated intelligence services as well as services 
having intelligence as a complementary mission, such as: 
                                                 
61 “Organisation de l’État-major et du Cabinet du Haut Commandant de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
ainsi que les Attributions des Autorités de Commandement,” Arrêté Ministériel No. 2075 MFA-DIRCEL 
[Organization of the General Staff and the Office of the High Commander of the National Gendarmerie and 
the Powers of the Command Authorities] Journal Officiel De La République Du Sénégal (2005), accessed 
April 2, 2018, http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article3420. 
62 Arrêté Ministériel No. 2075 MFA-DIRCEL. 
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 The General Delegation for National Intelligence (DRN), which is a 
special intelligence service whose mission is to collect, both inside and 
outside the national territory, to analyze and disseminate to the President 
of the Republic and the relevant decision-making authorities, information 
relating to threats to the security and fundamental interests of the Nation. 
The DRN is led by the General Delegate for National Intelligence, 
appointed by the president. It is the general coordinating body of 
intelligence responsible for centralizing, exploiting, analyzing, and 
disseminating to the President of the Republic, the productions sent to him 
by the other intelligence services. 
 The Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST), which is responsible 
for: research and centralization of the information needed to inform the 
government and the public authorities in the political, economic, and 
social spheres; research and the observation of all threats against the state 
security; the fight against terrorism, concurrently or in relation with other 
security services; the surveillance and control of gambling establishments 
(casinos, etc.); assisting in the processing of applications for association 
receipts; control of the production of the press and the national and 
international bookstore; the control of the import, transit, export, trade, 
port, and possession of arms and ammunition in connection with the 
Customs Administration; the processing of applications for entry and short 
stay visas in Senegal; counter-interference.63  
 The Directorate of Air and Frontier Police (DPAF), which is responsible 
for: the application of the laws and regulations relating to the land, sea, 
and air border police; port and airport security and safety; control of the 
admission of persons; cross-border intelligence research; the fight against 
irregular migration. 
                                                 
63 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), [The Directorate of Territorial Surveillance] 
accessed April 2, 2018, http://www.policenationale.gouv.sn/dirsurveillance.html. 
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In addition, the intelligence community participates in the fight against 
transnational organized crime involving small arms, vehicles, and stolen objects or art 
work and trafficking in drugs or persons and similar practices.64  
 The Counter-Terrorism Cell (CLAT) aims to combat terrorist threats, in 
cooperation with the services of friendly countries, in the framework of a 
partnership whose modalities will be defined by a protocol of agreement. 
Its mission is to collect, process and exploit information of all kinds 
relating to all categories of terrorist threats. The Counter-Terrorism Cell is 
also responsible for providing advice and recommendations on prevention 
and counter-terrorism policy. As part of the accomplishment of their 
missions, the members of the Cell implement all human and material 
means necessary for the collection of information on the activities of the 
terrorist groups and for the neutralization of the various threats, in 
cooperation with allied countries.65  
In Decree No. 2014–1244 / PR of November 29, 2014, on the organization and 
functioning of the intelligence community, the DIVDOC is classified among the services 
having intelligence mission as complementary. Yet, DIVDOC actively participates in 
intelligence activities of the intelligence community. It is a permanent member of the 
Joint Intelligence Cell (CMR), which is an information exchange platform that brings 
together the DST, the DPAF, the DRN, the CLAT, and the Senegalese Armed Forces 
intelligence network.66  
                                                 
64 Abdoulaye Wade, Décret No. 2003–292, “Organisation du Ministère de l’Intérieur,” [Organization 
of the Ministry of the Interior] Journal Officiel De La Republique Du Senegal (2003), accessed April 3, 
2018, http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article770. 
65 Abdoulaye Wade, Décret No. 2003–388, “Création d’une Cellule de Lutte Anti-Terrorisme,” 
[Creation of an Anti-Terrorist Cell] Journal Officiel De La Republique Du Senegal (2003), accessed April 
3, 2018, http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article798; Arrêté Ministériel No. 5457 MINT/CAB, “La 
Composition, l’Organisation et les Missions de la Cellule de Lutte Anti-Terroriste (CLAT),” [The 
Composition, Organization and Missions of the Anti-Terrorist Cell (CLAT)] Journal Officiel De La 
Republique Du Senegal (2004), accessed April 03, 2018, http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article2465. 
66 “Organisation De La Police Nationale,” [Organization of the National Police] Ministère de 




1. Transparency and Oversight 
With regard to control and transparency, Senegal is struggling to focus on 
intelligence services. Senegal has established several control bodies such as the General 
Inspectorate of State (IGE),67 which is charged to ensure all public services of the 
Republic observe the laws, orders, decrees, regulations, and instructions that govern the 
administrative, financial, and accounting operations Furthermore, the IGE is responsible 
for studying the quality of the functioning of these services, the way in which they are 
managed and their results; and for verifying the use of the public appropriations and the 
regularity of the operations of the administrators, the authorizing officers, the accountants 
and managers of moneys and matters. Finally, the IGE has the responsibility to propose 
all necessary measures to simplify and improve the quality of the Administration, to 
lower its operating costs and increase its efficiency; and to give its opinion on the bills, 
orders, decrees, regulations, instructions, and other matters submitted to IGE by the 
President of the Republic. The IGE mission is exercised on all public services of Senegal 
regardless of their management mode (service governed, conceded, and autonomous) or 
their geographical location (central, regional, and external services), including public 
institutions placed under the supervision of the State, regardless of the status or name of 
these institutions, as well as local authorities and their public institutions. The scope of 
the IGE’s mission also extends to the administration of the Army; administrative and 
financial management of the judicial services; national societies; majority-owned 
companies; private-law legal persons receiving financial assistance from public 
authorities; and relations between controlled institutions or agents and third parties, in 
particular, public and private banking bodies. In the latter case, professional secrecy 
cannot be opposed to the IGE controlling personnel.68  
Another control and oversight body is the National Assembly, which creates the 
finance law that determines the amount of operating and investment credits allocated to 
national defense. The National Assembly has, in addition, 11 standing committees, 
                                                 




including the Defense and Security Committee.69 The latter is responsible for all matters 
relating to the National Defense and Preservation of Territorial Integrity; Military 
Cooperation; Military and Para Military Establishments; Civilian Personnel in Armed 
Forces; Public Security; Security; Gendarmerie and military justice. 
Finally, the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces (IGFA)70 and the Internal 
Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie (IIGN)71 can also both exercise control over 
intelligence activities carried out by the armed forces, the IIGN’s oversight is, however, 
limited to the gendarmerie only. 
Despite the implementation of these control mechanisms, it remains very difficult 
to observe evidence of their audit and control of intelligence services. This stems from 
their lack of knowledge about intelligence, on the one hand, and their lack of interest, on 
the other. For example, several times Members of Parliament (MPs) have had to ask 
questions about wiretapping, showing their ignorance of intelligence activities as MPs.72 
At the same time, these interrogations of the deputies point to the lack of discussion about 
the intelligence services at the national assembly level. As for the role of the media, there 
is a lack of interest in intelligence on their part. This apathy has led to public ignorance 
about the activities of the intelligence services, which are often considered institutions 
serving the executive branch. According to a study conducted from March to July 2015 
by the Platform of Non-State Actors73 on “the perception of citizens of the State control 
                                                 
69 “Commissions,” Assemblée Nationale, accessed April 18, 2018, http://www.assemblee-
nationale.sn/xml-1411131120-page-rub30-int.xml?p=active30. 
70 Abdou Diouf, Loi No. 84–62, “Organisation Générale des Forces Armées,” [General Organization 
of the Armed Forces] Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal (1984). 
71 Abdoulaye Wade, Décret No. 2006–112/PR/MFA, “Organisation du Haut Commandement de la 
Gendarmerie Nationale, ainsi que les Attributions des Autorités de Commandement,” [Translation] Journal 
Officiel de la République du Sénégal (2006). 
72 “Assemblée Nationale: « Est-ce Qu’il Y a Des écoutes Téléphoniques Sur Certaines Personnalités 
Sénégalaises ? », (député),” [National Assembly: “Are There Any Telephone Taping of Some Senegalese 
Personalities? ,” (deputy)] Pressafrik, accessed April 18, 2018, https://www.pressafrik.com/DIRECT-
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depute_a174015.html; “Aïda Mbodj Et Les écoutes Téléphoniques,” [Aïda Mbodj and The Phone 
Tappings] SenXibar, accessed April 18, 2018, https://www.senxibar.com/Aida-Mbodj-et-les-ecoutes-
telephoniques_a42235.html. 




and regulation bodies (case of the Army and the Court of Accounts),” 52 percent of 
citizens say they have never seen a report of bodies and organs of control and regulation, 
39 percent do not know anything about such mechanisms, and only 3 percent have 
consulted such reports very often.74  
2. Senegalese Gendarmerie Democratization 
To assess democratization of the Senegalese National Gendarmerie intelligence 
services, I rely on Matei and Andres de Castro García’s intelligence democratization 
framework.75 In the 2018 Freedom House indices, Senegal scores 2,76 granting the 
country classification as a free democracy. Despite this outstanding score by Senegal in 
comparison to other African countries, it lacks active control by mechanisms in the 
intelligence domain. Table 1 considers the institutional organization of Senegal with its 
intelligence services as a whole, as well as their performance. Values ranging from low to 
high are assigned to each requirement. 
                                                 
74 “IGE, Cour Des Comptes, ARMP..., : 56 % Des Sénégalais Ignorent L’existence Des Organes De 
Contrôle Et De Régulation,” [IGE, Court of Auditors, ARMP ...,: 56% of Senegalese Ignore the Existence 
of Control and Regulation Mechanisms] SeneNews, July 14, 2015, https://www.senenews.com/actualites/
societe/ige-cour-des-comptes-armp-56-des-senegalais-ignorent-lexistence-des-organes-de-controle-et-de-
regulation_134365.html. 
75 Florina Cristiana Matei and Andrés De Castro García, “Chilean Intelligence after Pinochet: 
Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counter,Intelligence 30, no. 2 (2017): 357–360, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2017.1263530. 
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a. Requirements for Control 
Senegal scores “Low-medium” in the Institutional Control Mechanisms category. 
Control mechanisms have been established and a legal framework has been created to 
support intelligence control. The DRN has numerous civilian employees, and the military 
intelligence does not influence it. 
In the Oversight category, Senegal scores once more “Low-medium,” principally 
due to the lack of intelligence knowledge and interest exhibited by MPs. While control 
mechanisms are established at the executive and the legislative levels, intelligence 
debates rarely occur at the national assembly level. Regarding the press, few journalists 
have written about intelligence activities. This reality tends to diminish over time, thanks 
to the development of the Internet and social media, which have promoted the 
globalization of information. More interest in gendarmerie intelligence services activities 
would probably lead to a better understanding of their job, which is, for many 
Senegalese, a shadow area. Given the near absence of debates about intelligence activities 
at the national assembly level, the media could play an important role in leading the 
government to communicate more about intelligence. For example, when a former 
gendarmerie intelligence officer published a book about corruption and scandals in the 
National Gendarmerie, the Minister of the Armed Forces made a public statement 
                                                 
77 Adapted from Florina Cristiana Matei and Andrés De Castro García, “Chilean Intelligence after 
Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counter Intelligence 30, no. 2 (2017): 357–360, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2017.1263530. 
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announcing that an investigation would be opened by the Inspectorate-General of the 
Armed Forces.78 This book, which was published in France, was brought to the 
Senegalese public’s attention by the media. 
Senegal scores “Medium” in the Professional Norms category. Even though the 
DRN has civilian employees who are trained professionals in various positions, the 
military, the National Gendarmerie, and the National Police, which provide the majority 
of DRN’s personnel, need to specialize more of their agents. 
b. Requirements for Effectiveness 
In the Plan or Strategy category, Senegal scores “Medium-high.” Since 2014 and 
the reorganization of the Senegalese intelligence community, Senegalese policy makers 
have developed strong intelligence strategies and orientations, leading Senegal to be one 
of the most stable countries in the Sahel region. 
Senegal scores “Medium” in the Institutions category. Senegal has developed an 
organized intelligence community with cooperation platforms (CMR). Nonetheless, the 
intelligence system could be more effective if the role assigned to some institutions, such 
the gendarmerie and the penitentiary administration, are revised and upgraded. 
In the Resources category, Senegal scores “Medium-high.” Senegalese 
intelligence services generally have limited resources at their disposal due to the stability 
of the country. With the creation of the DRN, important resources were allocated to it. 
The law No. 2016–33 of December 14, 2016, relating to the intelligence services,79 
describes the means that can be used by the special intelligence services in order to 
succeed in their missions. These means include, among others, monitoring devices and 
location. However, other intelligence services such as the gendarmerie’s intelligence 
                                                 
78 “Sénégal: L’auteur De «Pour L’honneur De La Gendarmerie» Mis Aux Arrêts,” [Senegal: The 
Author Of “For The Honor Of The Gendarmerie” Arrested] RFI Afrique, August 14, 2014, 
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abdoulaye-fall-casamance. 
79 Macky Sall, Loi No. 2016–33 “Services de Renseignement,” [Intelligence Services] Journal 




services suffer from a lack of resources (including functional vehicles and special 
equipment). 
C. CONCLUSION 
Finally, it appears that the Senegalese National Gendarmerie, despite its active 
participation in intelligence missions within the community, is struggling to position 
itself among the leaders. This fact is explained by multiple causes. First, the Senegalese 
National Gendarmerie’s intelligence services lack professionalization. Given the large 
territory it covers, the gendarmerie should play a leading role in intelligence missions. 
Secondly, the lack of adequate training and specialization path for gendarmerie personnel 
has resulted in a failure by brigades to fulfill correctly intelligence missions. Lastly, the 
almost non-existent oversight and civilian control calls for a transformation of the 
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III. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE FRENCH 
GENDARMERIE 
Since the creation of the French National Gendarmerie during the Hundred Years 
War (1337–1457),80 its intelligence services have undergone several transformations, 
including an update of its capacities, an update of its competencies, and the creation of new 
units adapted to contemporary threats. Despite its active participation on the intelligence 
mission within the intelligence community, the gendarmerie’s intelligence services remain 
unproven in terms of effectiveness. This chapter discusses the organization of the French 
National Gendarmerie, its evolution, its intelligence missions, and how effective and 
democratically accountable they are. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL GENDARMERIE 
The gendarmerie is the heiress of the Maréchaussées81 dates back to the Hundred 
Years War (1337–1457) when it was created to control the behavior of the troops.82 On 
January 25, 1536, King François I extended the jurisdiction of the Maréchaussées, which 
had thus far been limited to the misdeeds by deployed troops, to include all major crimes 
whether their perpetrators were military or civilians, wanderers or residents. Consequently, 
the Maréchaussées became a military and police force with responsibility for the 
countryside and the main roads of the kingdom, and remains the foundation of the specific 
mission assigned to the gendarmerie to the present.83  
                                                 
80 “La Gendarmerie, Héritière Des Maréchaussées,” [The Gendarmerie, Heiress of the Maréchaussées] 
Gendarmerie, accessed April 4, 2018, https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Notre-institution/Notre-
histoire/La-gendarmerie-de-sa-naissance-a-aujourd-hui/La-gendarmerie-heritiere-des-marechaussees. 
81 The Maréchaussées were the military corps responsible for police, public order, and military justice 
since the Middle Ages. 
82 Gendarmerie, “La Gendarmerie, Héritière Des Maréchaussées.” 
83 Sady, La Gendarmerie, 40–41. 
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After the 1778 reform of the Maréchaussées,84 all the Maréchaussées were placed 
under one body: The Maréchaussée, counting 4,114 men on the eve of the French 
Revolution. This period was decisive since it devised the roles of the Maréchaussée and the 
gendarmerie for several centuries: to seek and prosecute criminals, to ensure the free 
movement of goods and people, to observe the behavior of the troops, to ensure the orderly 
proceedings in the parties and other assemblies, and to maintain public safety and 
tranquility in all circumstances.85 The gendarmerie was identified as the “public force”86 
announced in the declaration of the rights of man and the citizen of August 26, 1789.87  
The law of February 16, 1791, made the force the National Gendarmerie. It is no 
longer in the service of the King, but of the law.88 In 1849, the Republican Guard89 became 
attached to the gendarmerie. In 1854, a decree reorganized the institution. Still under the 
Second Empire, the gendarmerie again proved its fighting expertise by taking part in the 
Crimean War (1854–1856), especially during the siege of Sevastopol in 1855, as well as in 
the Franco-German conflict of 1870–1871. The decree of May 20, 1903, does not modify 
the missions of the gendarmerie, but reaffirms its military status.90  
                                                 
84 “Société Nationale De L’histoire Et Du Patrimoine De La Gendarmerie (SNHPG ), Histoire 
Gendarmerie,” [National Society Of The History And Heritage Of The Gendarmerie (SNHPG), History 
Gendarmerie] Forces Publiques, accessed April 29, 2018, https://www.force-publique.net/
index.php?page=3&ch=3. 
85 Gendarmerie, “La Gendarmerie, Héritière Des Maréchaussées.” 
86 “The guarantee of the rights of man and of the citizen requires a public force: this force is thus 
instituted for the benefit of all, and not for the particular utility of those to whom it is entrusted,” See 
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, [The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen of 1789] Article 12, Légifrance, accessed April 4, 2018, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-
francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789. 
87 Sady, La Gendarmerie, 40–41. 
88 Sady, 42. 
89 The Republican Guard is the heiress of all the military corps which, since the first Frankish kings, 
have ensured the protection of the city, the security of the institutions and the honor of the high authorities 
of the State. By decree of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, this body is integrated into the gendarmerie on 
February 1, 1849; See “Garde Républicaine,” [Republican Guard] Gendarmerie, accessed April 4, 2018, 
https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/garde-republicaine/Decouverte/Histoire. 





During the First World War, the French National Gendarmerie played the role of 
provost. Because of the nature of its mission (i.e., control of the activities of the 
combatants), some combatants criticized it. In February 1918, the government set up a Sub-
Directorate of the Gendarmerie, whose command was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Plique. In addition, gendarmes received the rank of noncommissioned officer.91  
The inter-war period was also a period of great changes for the gendarmerie. In 
1921, to fulfill its mission of maintaining the public order, the French National 
Gendarmerie created mobile squads of gendarmes, in reinforcement of brigades, attached to 
the legions of departmental gendarmeries. These units would later provide the majority of 
the personnel and equipment of the 45th Battalion. The latter resisted during the fighting of 
the spring of 1940 in the Ardennes.92  
Since the Second World War, the gendarmerie has experienced several changes. 
First, its superior command, after having been attached to military justice within a 
Directorate of Military Justice and within the gendarmerie in 1947, found a new autonomy 
in 1981. Indeed, hierarchically attached to the army, the French National Gendarmerie 
asserts itself as an autonomous military force within the Ministry of Defense93 with the 
creation of the Directorate General of the National Gendarmerie. Then, the management of 
the gendarmerie also changed. Directed since 1947 by a civilian, such as a magistrate or 
prefect, it has been since 2004 overseen by a General of the Gendarmerie.94 Indeed, the 
gendarmerie has long been managed by a high-ranking civil servant because of the civilian 
nature of most of its missions,95 including protection of the population and its property and 
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92 “L’entre-deux-guerres,” [Between the Two Wars] Gendarmerie, accessed April 05, 2018, 
https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Notre-institution/Notre-histoire/La-gendarmerie-de-sa-
naissance-a-aujourd-hui/L-entre-deux-guerres. 
93 Christelle Chichignoud, “La Gendarmerie, Force De Sécurité Au Service De La Nation,” [The 
Gendarmerie, Security Force at the Service of the Nation] Hérodote116, no. 1 (2005): 85–86, 
https://doi.org/10.3917/her.116.0082. 
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the execution of judicial missions. Also, this period corresponds to a period of internal 
tensions within the gendarmerie that resulted from the poor social and working conditions 
of the gendarmes. Thus, the appointment of a new director from the ranks of the 
gendarmerie was to allow greater consideration of the concerns of gendarmes, by an 
administrator who knows the realities of the institution.96 Moreover, because of his civilian 
status, the director of the gendarmerie was often excluded from the military coordination 
bodies, unless there was an expressed waiver.97  
The departmental gendarmerie has also seen its field of action extended with the 
establishment of units made up of specialized personnel. These specialized personnel have 
responsibility for the missions of general surveillance and protection of the people and the 
goods, and consist of platoons of supervision and intervention (PSIG) created in 1975, 
including mountain platoons, river brigades, and air sections. Other specialized personnel 
are traffic police, organized in motorized platoons, squadrons, and motorway squads, and 
judicial police, including research units and the Criminal Research Institute of the National 
Gendarmerie for the Scientific Police. In addition, to strengthen and optimize brigade 
service, Gendarmerie Operational Centers (COG) were created in 1990 and Brigade 
Communities (Cob) in 2005. The new articulation improved operations and intelligence 
coordination.98  
The mobile gendarmerie, whose name was changed from the Republican Mobile 
Guard in 1954, remains a specialized force in maintaining public order. It is charged to 
maintain public order and, when necessary, restore it. Notably, after the events of 1968,99 
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the mobile gendarmerie experienced several wounded100 due to inadequate equipment and 
a lack of special training of gendarmes in the maintenance of public order. These lessons 
led to the creation of a development center installed in Saint-Astier in 1969. Similarly, in 
the 1970s, to address the rising threat of Islamist terrorism in France, the National 
Gendarmerie Intervention Group (GIGN) was created.101  
One of the major changes experienced by the French National Gendarmerie is 
probably its recent attachment to the French Ministry of the Interior. In 2002, the process 
of attaching the gendarmerie to the Ministry of the Interior was initiated. In Decree No. 
2002–889 of May 15, 2002,102 it is stipulated that for the exercise of its homeland 
security missions, the Minister of the Interior, Internal Security and Local Freedoms is 
responsible for the employment of services of the National Gendarmerie. Until then, the 
gendarmerie was placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior “for 
employment” in matters of homeland security. 
Since the law No. 2009–971 of August 3, 2009, relating to the French National 
Gendarmerie,103 the gendarmerie has been attached to and placed under the authority of 
the French Ministry of the Interior. Nevertheless, the gendarmerie retains its military status 
and the Minister of Defense participates in the management of human resources, is 
exclusively responsible for disciplinary matters and for the participation of the gendarmerie 
in military missions, notably alongside the armed forces outside the national territory.  
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B. THE FRENCH GENDARMERIE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
As in Senegal, the French Gendarmerie’s intelligence services are not part of 
special intelligence services of the intelligence community. As stated by Chopin, “the 
Gendarmerie Nationale … is one of the primary police forces that ensure comprehensive 
surveillance on French soil.”104 Indeed, present in almost all parts of the territory, the 
gendarmerie constitutes a major asset in the field of homeland security and general 
surveillance, and therefore plays an important role in national intelligence. However, the 
current standing of the gendarmerie in the intelligence community105 is justified by the fact 
that the gendarmerie has barely started reforms and development of its intelligence 
services.  
Even though gendarmes have the capacity to collect intelligence, they generally 
do not follow the intelligence cycle due to a lack of professional training, which 
contributes to the dissemination of raw information or intelligence that is not related to 
the national security interest. The type of information that gendarmes collect is frequently 
related to petty crimes as well as community-based social concerns. Hence, any 
information collected was rarely analyzed.106 The gendarmerie which has not specifically 
trained its personnel on intelligence, has begun therefore to focus on intelligence of 
interest to national security,107 especially intelligence pertaining to counterterrorism in 
regards to the new security environment in France.  
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In 2014, the gendarmerie created the Sub-Directorate of Operational Anticipation 
(SDAO). The SDAO has several missions, it proposes the doctrine relating to intelligence 
missions within the gendarmerie; processes internal and external information to alert the 
authorities, as well as the monitors sensitive short-term situations; participates in the 
research, collection, analysis, and dissemination of defense, public order, and national 
security information necessary for the execution of the gendarmerie’s missions; handles 
the processing of operational intelligence of public order and economic security 
intelligence in metropolitan France and overseas; leads or participates, with the other sub-
directorates of the Operations and Employment Department, in interdepartmental crisis 
management; and monitors and coordinates the actions of the units in their areas of 
responsibility.108 The SDAO includes the Operational Intelligence Center of the 
Gendarmerie and the Analysis and Exploitation Center.109 Also, the Counter-Terrorism 
Bureau (BLAT) in the gendarmerie has important intelligence capabilities and plays a 
central role in countering terrorism.110 The BLAT acts both in the field of intelligence 
(prevention) and in that of the judicial police (law enforcement). It is responsible for 
analyzing, developing, and disseminating the information to the authorities concerned. It 
is responsible for coordinating, at the national level, the action of the gendarmerie units 
or services involved in the fight against terrorism, violent extremism, or attacks on state 
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110 The BLAT is a French operational unit created in 2003, specializing in anti-terrorism, and 
reporting to the Direction of the Judicial Police (SDPJ) of the Directorate General of the National 
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security. Within the Directorate General of the National Gendarmerie (DGGN), it can 
now receive the support of the SDAO.111  
All these efforts taken by the French National Gendarmerie have resulted in the 
recognition of its services’ effectiveness in terms of intelligence and counterterrorism by 
the French authorities.112  
1. Transparency and Oversight 
In France, the oversight of the activities of the intelligence services is done on 
several levels.113 There is, for example, internal administrative and hierarchical control. 
At the level of each ministry (Defense, Interior, and Finance), it is the responsibility of 
the hierarchy, at the top of which the minister has ultimate responsibility, to ensure that 
the activity of the service is in line with its mission. 
Independent administrative authorities also play an active role in intelligence 
activities oversight. Among these authorities are the National Commission for the Control 
of Interceptions of Security (CNCIS), which checks the legality of requests for 
interception of administrative communications and gives an opinion before the 
authorization decision by the Prime Minister; and the Advisory Committee on the Secrets 
of National Defense (CCSDN), which gives its opinion on requests for the 
declassification of information protected by national defense secrecy. Another 
independent administrative authority is the National Commission for Informatics and 
Liberties (CNIL), which ensures the protection of personal data, including those collected 
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by the intelligence services.114 The General Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie 
(IGGN) attached to the Director General of the National Gendarmerie also has a 
controlling role. It must respond to external complaints from private individuals and 
independent administrative authorities, as well as internal requests related to 
administrative inquiries. The IGGN ensures and instills respect for deontology, and can 
carry out judicial investigations when agents are implicated.115  
In addition, the committees of the assemblies, as well as the investigation 
commissions if necessary, can monitor the activity of the gendarmerie intelligence 
services.116 In fact, the Director of the Gendarmerie is, whenever necessary, heard by the 
commissions of the National Assembly, notably the National Defense and Armed Forces 
Commission, on matters related to the gendarmerie missions as well intelligence 
activities.117  
As in any democracy, the French media often addresses issues related to the 
activities of the intelligence services. For the most part, the media has focused more on 
scandals implicating the intelligence services. As Damien Van Puyvelde explains, the 
media approach to intelligence issues in France has been reactive rather than proactive. 
Some journalists do not master the field, failing to properly inform and educate the public 
about intelligence.118 Gerald Arboit and Michel Mathien reinforce the position of Van 
Puyvelde, explaining that media actors used to treat intelligence-related business affairs 
as news items, emphasizing burrs and other imperfections rather than successes. For 
example, in 2009 the newspaper Le Monde published an article recounting the rivalry of 
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the intelligence services of the police and the gendarmerie. In this article, the mode of 
operation of the gendarmerie’s intelligence services was strongly criticized for operating 
out of their jurisdiction, using intimidation, and so forth.119  
2. French Gendarmerie Democratization 
As I did for Senegal, I rely on Matei and Bruneau’s intelligence democratization 
framework to assess French Gendarmerie intelligence democratization. See Table 2. 



















High High High High 
 
a. Requirements for Control 
France scores “High” in the Institutional Control Mechanisms category. Control 
mechanisms have been institutionalized and reinforced along with the legal framework. 
The legislative control, which includes a dual competency between the National 
Assembly and the Senate, makes it particularly strong and reliable.121  
In the Oversight category, France scores “Low-medium” due to the significant 
number of oversight mechanisms in place. At the senate and the national assembly levels, 
there is debate on intelligence matters and issuance of directives and amendments, but 
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only occasionally.122 While in the past the media focused more on scandals related to 
intelligence activities, more recently professional journalists, with deep knowledge on 
intelligence issues, have been publishing reliable and substantive articles on the topic.123 
By having professional journalists interested in and writing about intelligence activities, 
the public has a better understanding of the intelligence function in the state, and at the 
same time, intelligence oversight is strengthened.  
France scores “High” in the Professional Norms category. Since the recent 
reforms through the creation of the intelligence community, France is still 
professionalizing its intelligence agencies. The creation of the Intelligence Academy, 
which is part of the intelligence community, illustrates perfectly the willingness France to 
professionalize and improve its intelligence services. 
b. Requirements for Effectiveness 
In the Plan or Strategy category, France scores “High” also. In fact, the National 
Intelligence Council, a specialized service of the Defense and National Security Council, 
defines the strategic orientations and the intelligence priorities, and establishes the 
planning of the human and technical resources of the intelligence services.124 Also, the 
national intelligence coordinator advises the President of the Republic in the field of 
intelligence. The National Intelligence Council prepares the National Intelligence 
Strategy and the National Intelligence Orientation Plan.125 Moreover, taking intelligence 
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into account as an essential point in the 2013 Defense and National Security White Paper 
clearly defines the role and place of intelligence in France.126  
Similarly, France scores “High” in the Institutions category. The country has a 
well-organized intelligence community, composed of several intelligence services, both 
civilian and military. Cooperation between agencies is smooth and effective since the 
creation of the National Intelligence Coordinator function in July 2008.127  
In the Resources category, France scores “High.” Whether in terms of human 
resources or financial resources, France allocates significant resources to its intelligence 
services, including the gendarmerie. This priority of funding could be explained by the role 
of France in combating terrorism at the international level, which has made it a prime target 
for terrorist organizations. The allocation of ample resource may also reflect a concern for 
adequacy according to the evolution of the security situation in Europe, which is impacted 
by immigration, religious radicalism, and the rise of nationalism. As an illustration, Table 
3, which shows the distribution of human and financial resources in French intelligence,128 
highlights the importance of intelligence in the French state apparatus. 
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Table 3.   Distribution of Human and Financial Resources in French Intelligence129  
 
 
In 2018, the budget of the internal security forces (police and gendarmerie) is 
€ 12.8 billion, up 1.4 percent from 2017. The exceptional resources granted to the internal 
security forces in the last two years are therefore consolidated and increased. Thus, 
compared to 2015, the 2018 budget for internal security represents € 1 billion of 
additional appropriations, of which 16 percent is an increase for operating and investment 
resources.130  
Finally, even if the intelligence services of the French National Gendarmerie are 
not part of the special services of the French intelligence community, their role remains 
crucial. For a long time, the gendarmerie, despite its many transformations, did not 
prioritize the intelligence function. Present on 95 percent of the French national territory 
and even outside,131 and especially in the most remote areas, the gendarmerie’s 
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intelligence mission should be among the most effective at all levels (judiciary, domestic, 
terrorism, etc.) 
C. CONCLUSION 
Despite the active role played by the French National Gendarmerie in the 
intelligence community, particularly in the fight against terrorism, it is not supervised by 
most of the control bodies; these organs are generally limited to the special services of 
the intelligence community. Nevertheless, the creation of the BLAT and the SDAO show 
a clear will on the part of the gendarmerie to reposition itself within the intelligence 
community. Even if the Director of the Gendarmerie testifies at the National Assembly 
about intelligence activities, the intelligence services of the gendarmerie lack relatively 
proper oversight. This gap is concerning, particularly in light of new intelligence law, 
which has strengthened and expanded the security force’s powers to the detriment of 
individual liberties.132 Most recently, the Domestic Security and Counter-Terrorism law, 
adopted in 2017, includes many measures such as house arrest, and search and control of 
persons in investigations related to terrorism. This law also extends the scope of checks 
in border areas, around airports, ports and stations, and authorizes prefects to temporarily 
close places of worship. It is consistently criticized by human rights groups such as 
Human Rights Watch for being ineffective and undermining individual liberties.133 And 
it was during a visit to the mobile gendarmerie troops deployed to secure the French 
capital (Paris) in the fight against terrorism, that Gerard Collomb, Minister of the Interior 
at the time, welcomed the official publication and the entry into force of the new law.134  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The two preceding chapters provided overviews of the intelligence services of the 
Senegalese and French gendarmeries, respectively. These chapters highlighted weak 
points and insufficiencies in both the Senegalese and the French gendarmeries’ 
intelligence services. Although the French National Gendarmerie model is not perfect, its 
democratic accountability and its effectiveness can provide a good framework to shape 
Senegalese gendarmerie intelligence services.  
This chapter answers the research question of how the Senegalese gendarmerie 
can transform its intelligence services to increase their effectiveness while also remaining 
democratically accountable. The chapter also tests the hypothesis that Senegal must 
establish a control mechanism, such as a bureau of supervision under the command of the 
Internal Inspection of the Gendarmerie to oversee the intelligence activities of the 
gendarmerie and ensure the institution remains democratically accountable and 
transparent while operationally effective. The test involves drawing up various points of 
improvement for the Senegalese National Gendarmerie, while relying on the comparative 
study of the French National Gendarmerie. Then, this chapter discusses the findings from 
the overview chapters on the Senegalese and French gendarmeries. To finish, this chapter 
provides recommendations for successfully implementing reform of Senegalese 
gendarmerie intelligence services by making them effective and democratically 
accountable. 
A. ANALYSIS OF SENEGAL’S AND FRANCE’S GENDARMERIE 
INTELLIGENCE DEMOCRATIZATION 
The democratic reforms of the gendarmerie intelligence services in Senegal and 
France have been lengthy and cumbersome processes. Both cases share similarities and 
divergences, in terms of achieving institutional and operational effectiveness, as well as 
democratic oversight of intelligence.  
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1. On Intelligence Effectiveness 
 Both Senegal and France have gaps in intelligence effectiveness, for a variety of 
reasons. To begin with, in both countries, the gendarmerie intelligence services have a 
limited role within the overall intelligence community of their respective countries. 
Senegal, for one, still struggles to increase the role of its gendarmerie within the 
intelligence community, partly because intelligence is a complementary mission. In this 
context, besides the DIVDOC, the Senegalese National Gendarmerie does not include 
any other unit specifically dedicated to intelligence. Nevertheless, although the DIVDOC 
is not part of special intelligences services of the intelligence community, it does 
participate in intelligence meetings and missions within that community. In addition, the 
DIVDOC is a permanent member of the Joint Intelligence Cell (CMR), which makes it 
aware of and enables it to participate on every important security topic discussed by the 
other intelligence services. Ultimately, however, the Senegalese gendarmerie intelligence 
services play only a complementary role in the overall Senegalese intelligence 
community. 
By contrast, in France, although the intelligence services of the French 
gendarmerie are not part of the special services of the intelligence community, they 
remain more efficient and better structured than their counterparts in Senegal. These 
services include the DGSE, for foreign intelligence; DGSI, for homeland intelligence; 
DRM, military intelligence; DRSD, counter-interference (CI) defense intelligence; 
DNRED, customs related intelligence; and TRACFIN: finances related intelligence. 
These services are exclusively charged to lead within the intelligence community on 
intelligence related to their domain,135 and they actively participate in intelligence 
missions within the community. In this context, gendarmerie personnel is integrated into 
the territorial intelligence service (SCRT), with 150 gendarmes in 75 SCRT offices, and 
conversely with the reception within the SDAO of two officials of the national police and 
the DGSI. The DGSI also has an officer of the gendarmerie. Then, regular intelligence 
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exchanges take place between the DGSI and the SCRT. Every intelligence matter 
relevant to a gendarmerie area of expertise that arises in these exchanges is then sent to 
the SDAO. Finally, the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT) organizes a weekly 
meeting with intelligence services, in which the SDAO participates.136  
Furthermore, the attachment of the gendarmerie to the Ministry of the Interior 
constitutes a major advance in terms of effectiveness for the intelligence services of the 
French National Gendarmerie. Indeed, most of the missions of the gendarmerie are 
homeland security missions. The attachment of the gendarmerie directly to the Ministry 
of the Interior also facilitates cooperation between the police forces (that is, the National 
Police and French National Gendarmerie). Although 90 percent of the DGSI is made up 
of police officers,137 the presence of gendarmes within it facilitates its cooperation with 
the intelligence services of the gendarmerie. Since 2014, a gendarmerie officer has been 
assigned as an assistant to the SCRT while a police commissioner is assigned as a deputy 
to the SDAO.138 These exchanges of personnel reflect a desire to bring police forces 
closer together for better cooperation in intelligence matters. Also, the consolidation of 
the police and gendarmerie budgets within the Ministry of the Interior allows for an 
optimization of the resources of the intelligence services of both police forces. 
One other common reason why both countries have gaps in the effectiveness of 
their gendarmerie intelligence services is the lack of proper prioritization of intelligence. 
In Senegal, for example, the gendarmes very rarely use the intelligence cycle in their day-
to-day activities, and as a result, the intelligence product disseminated to decision makers 
is unfinished. Like the Senegalese National Gendarmerie, the French National 
Gendarmerie has long integrated intelligence into its daily missions. However, it has not 
been able to prioritize the intelligence mission. Thanks to its vast territorial network, the 
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gendarmes collect a large amount of information. That information, however, is not 
properly processed due to insufficient knowledge of the intelligence cycle by the 
gendarmes.  
Thus, with the creation of the SDAO, the French National Gendarmerie has a 
body centralizing all the information and intelligence provided by the units and services 
of the gendarmerie. This reorganization allows the French gendarmerie to take advantage 
of its vast territorial network, which allows it to gather information on almost the entire 
French territory. Thus, with the creation of the SDAO to centralize, exploit, analyze, and 
disseminate the intelligence collected, the gendarmerie has a service exclusively 
responsible for intelligence. Also, the presence of Assistant Intelligence Officers at the 
level of each territorial area allows a better management of intelligence at all levels. 
Thus, even if the gendarmes who collect information do not use the intelligence cycle, the 
assistant intelligence officer will take all the necessary measures to ensure that the 
information collected is cross-checked, processed, and analyzed. The role of the Assistant 
Intelligence Officer thus enables the Chief of the Territorial area to respond effectively to 
the intelligence needs addressed to him by the civilian and military authorities. 
Another challenge to intelligence effectiveness in both countries—yet currently 
more prominent in Senegal as compared to France—involves education and training in 
intelligence. In Senegal, the related courses taught at the academy remain at a basic level, 
insufficient to allow learners to fully understand the intelligence cycle. Secondly, due to a 
lack of adequately trained personnel, intelligence training updates at the gendarmerie unit 
level are almost non-existent, making gendarmes serving in these units unaware of the 
role and importance of the intelligence function and its cycle. Lastly, other than those 
serving at the DIVDOC, the noncommissioned officers of the gendarmerie are rarely 
specialized in the field of intelligence. As far as the officers are concerned, specialization 
in the field of intelligence is very rare. The Senegalese gendarmerie inherited the French 
tradition, focusing mainly on the areas of judicial police and law enforcement. Thus, very 
few gendarmerie officers specialize in the field of intelligence. This dearth of specialized 
personnel leads to a glaring absence of the gendarmerie officers at the top levels of the 
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national intelligence structures (DRN, DGRE, DGRI, CLAT, etc.), for lack of 
qualification.  
In addition, the personnel from other gendarmerie units do not receive proper 
intelligence training. Having not received adequate training in intelligence, the 
gendarmes of other units collect information; however, they do not apply the intelligence 
cycle to make it a finished product. This failure to apply the intelligence cycle results in 
the dissemination of raw, untreated information to DIVDOC, which, in turn, greatly 
affects the gendarmerie’s intelligence mission. Because DIVDOC, which is in charge of 
the centralization of intelligence, often faces a lack of precision in the intelligence reports 
it receives, DIVDOC must carry out its own verifications to obtain a finished intelligence 
product. Having gendarmes of other units of the gendarmerie correctly trained in 
intelligence could prevent duplication of effort by the DIVDOC.  
 Similarly, the lack of specialized trained personnel in intelligence constitutes a 
major weak point for the Senegalese gendarmerie intelligence. At every level, including 
noncommissioned officers and officers, there are very few specialized personnel. Even if 
some personnel did receive adequate training in intelligence, they rarely have the 
opportunity to practice what they have learned due to the almost nonexistent career path 
in the intelligence domain of the gendarmerie. In terms of trainings, both officers and 
noncommissioned officers receive very basic training during their initial training at the 
academy. 
Like Senegal, France had—at least initially—failed to educate and train its 
gendarmerie intelligence services properly, partly because of its long tradition of 
proximity with local populations. This proximity facilitates gendarmerie personnel 
collecting relevant intelligence on a daily basis thanks to the strong relationships built 
with the local population.139 The lack of appropriate training, however, resulted in the 
gendarmerie failing to adequately execute its intelligence missions as security threats 
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evolved. Yet, the recent shift in the gendarmerie has led to a new reorganization of its 
intelligence services, and the French National Gendarmerie has made important efforts in 
intelligence training. Thus, since September 1, 2009, the National Operational 
Intelligence Training Center (CNFRO) has been created within the gendarmerie. This 
center ensures the professional training of gendarmerie officers and noncommissioned 
officers operating in various intelligence fields. One area is the reception and the 
exploitation of the telephone calls from the public to the departmental platforms such as 
centers of operations and intelligence of the gendarmerie (CORG). Other areas include 
the exploitation and management of general information (that is, non-judicial 
intelligence), and implementation of the work of the gendarmerie in the field of economic 
intelligence.140 In addition to the operational efficiency and the strengthening of 
standards in the execution of intelligence missions for the entire gendarmerie, the 
CNFRO allows gendarmerie officers to specialize in the field of intelligence. Over time, 
this specialization will allow gendarmerie officers to occupy positions commensurate 
with the officers inother intelligence structures of the community. 
Moreover, the creation of the Intelligence Academy is an important step forward. 
Not only does it contribute to the training of intelligence personnel, the strengthening of 
ties within the French intelligence community, and the dissemination of intelligence 
culture,141 but it constitutes a major asset for the training of the personnel of the whole 
French intelligence community, including those of the gendarmerie. This academy is of 
particular importance in that it allows all intelligence services staff to be trained to the 
same standards. It also facilitates cooperation between intelligence services by 
harmonizing information processing procedures. On the other hand, unlike the 
Senegalese gendarmerie, the French gendarmerie has increased specialization of its 
personnel in the field of intelligence. With the creation of the CNFRO, officers and 
noncommissioned officers are selected, trained, and specialized in intelligence. Though 
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the French gendarmerie has few representatives in the other intelligences services, that 
lack of representation is progressively changing with the integration of gendarmerie 
personnel in the other intelligence services like the SCRT.142 Thus, the French National 
Gendarmerie intelligence services are becoming more effective with more and better 
trained personnel. 
Moreover, the French gendarmerie is dedicated to improving counterterrorism-
related education and training by participating actively in BLAT. In sum, although the 
French gendarmerie did initially not make intelligence one of its top priorities, it has 
ultimately succeeded in maintaining its personnel at an acceptable level of education in 
the field of intelligence. 
All in all, the organization and structure of the French National Gendarmerie has 
made them more effective and more efficient than those of Senegal. The creation of new 
intelligence special units such as BLAT and SDAO, the assignment of intelligence 
officers in other national intelligence services, as well as the implementation of the 
CNFRO to train and specialize personnel in intelligence, have made the French National 
Gendarmerie far more able to fulfill its intelligence missions than the Senegalese 
gendarmerie. In this context, Eric Denece notes that France’s intelligence agencies, 
including those comprised in the gendarmerie, are “of high quality and have proven 
themselves to be well adapted to the country’s needs.”143 
2. On Intelligence Oversight 
Control and oversight of the gendarmerie intelligence agencies in both countries 
is precarious. Nevertheless, Senegal is lagging behind France. In this regard, the control 
and oversight in the gendarmerie’s intelligence service is almost non-existent in Senegal. 
Although the National Assembly of Senegal has a defense and security committee, 
debates on the activities of the intelligence services rarely take place. In particular, the 
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activities of the intelligence services of the gendarmerie, which is not considered as a 
special intelligence service within the Senegalese intelligence community, are unknown 
to the deputies. 
With regard to the media and civil society, issues relating to intelligence services 
and their activities are almost never raised—in either Senegal or France. Almost no 
debate or discussion of intelligence is organized by members of civil society, and few 
media publish articles on intelligence activities. The few journal articles published on 
intelligence services often deal with their role in an investigation or a public case, but 
rarely with their activities.  
Even if like Senegal, French National Gendarmerie intelligence services are not 
part of special services of the intelligence community, the recent attachment of the 
gendarmerie to the Ministry of Interior made them more known by the members of the 
National Assembly and Senate; thus, their activities are more transparent, and they are 
more accountable than those of Senegal. Indeed, the committees of the National 
Assembly and the Senate summon whenever necessary the chiefs of intelligence services 
of the gendarmerie. Even if the parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities in 
France needs to be improved, the testimony of the heads of services in relation to their 
missions and means, remains a major breakthrough in terms of transparency and 
democracy.  
Compared to Senegal, media oversight of intelligence activities is more effective 
in France. Even if in the past French media were more focused on intelligence scandals, 
they have significantly evolved and now discuss various intelligence topics in a more 
substantive way. They offer analysis and discussion of intelligence activities, budgets, as 
well as intelligence successes and failures. In addition, the media has lately become 
engaged in promoting an intelligence culture in France through film production. As such, 
the television show called the Bureau (originally titled Le Bureau des Légendes), akin to 
NCIS in the United States, is educating the public in what intelligence does in France and 
which ethical responsibilities, constraints, and limits it has as a democratic institution—
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hence, at a minimum, bringing the intelligence function closer to public.144 In the 
meantime, the media in France also acts as a watchdog, by monitoring and denouncing, if 
necessary, misconduct or violations related to intelligence services activities.145 
France and Senegal share similarities in terms of control and oversight of the 
gendarmerie intelligence services. Though the control mechanisms of intelligence exist, 
official discussion about their activities is still insufficient. However, the French National 
Gendarmerie intelligence services remain more transparent and accountable than their 
Senegalese counterparts, since legislative committees are interested in their activities. 
Likewise, with regard to the external control by the media and civil society, French the 
media today plays an important role in intelligence oversight thanks to their interest in 
intelligence topics. Also, civil society has recently begun to play its role in French 
intelligence. Thus, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DRM) has recently opened up 
to civil society by calling on researchers and start-ups to help address the “big data” 
phenomenon and new threats, in order to enhance their analysis capabilities and 
strengthen civil-military relations.146 
B. TESTING THE HPOTHESES  
Finally, it is clear that the Senegalese National Gendarmerie is experiencing many 
difficulties in the correct execution of its intelligence missions. These difficulties are 
mainly related to the organization of its intelligence services, which has not undergone 
any major change since the 2005 reform, which centered on the reorganization of the 
gendarmerie staff divisions and the emergence of the DIVDOC.147 In terms of 
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democratization, the intelligence services of the gendarmerie are almost unknown to the 
legislative control bodies. Finally, the lack of trained intelligence specialists in the 
gendarmerie has a negative impact on the overall intelligence performance of the 
gendarmerie units. 
In view of the foregoing, the reform of the intelligence services of the Senegalese 
gendarmerie is necessary, as hypothesized. Senegal’s gendarmerie’s intelligence services 
need a thorough reorganization, which should begin with the establishment of specialized 
units dedicated exclusively to intelligence gathering and analysis. This reorganization 
should take into account the tradeoff between intelligence effectiveness and transparency. 
Thus, Senegal must establish control mechanisms over the activities of the intelligence 
services of the gendarmerie, such as a bureau of supervision of activities of intelligence 
services (search operations, call record requests, etc.) that would be under the supervision 
of the commander of the Internal Inspection of the Gendarmerie, to allow the institution 
to remain democratically accountable and transparent while operationally effective. Also, 
a legal framework for the gendarmerie that clearly defines the role of its intelligence units 
and includes a control and oversight mechanism, such as a legislative committee, is 
needed. Finally, given the scarcity of intelligence specialists in the gendarmerie, Senegal 
needs a more robust career path for potential intelligence professionals to include better 
recruitment, promotion, education, and training. 
This reform could be based largely on the positive aspects of the French National 
Gendarmerie which, despite a delay in the intelligence field in France, has reorganized to 
raise its level of intelligence. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The overview and assessment of the Senegalese gendarmerie intelligence service 
clearly shows that the gendarmerie needs a thorough reorganization. This reorganization 
should first include the creation of new units exclusively dedicated to intelligence 
(operations and analysis). Prior to this reorganization, though, intelligence training in the 
gendarmerie must be completely reformed in order to have well-trained personnel to 
serve in the new dedicated intelligence units. To make the program more effective and 
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capable to train more specialists, this plan for this reform of the intelligence training 
program should be undertaken in cooperation with Senegal’s allies. In turn, these 
graduates of the new program can also train other gendarmerie units’ personnel on 
intelligence. The fact that few personnel of the gendarmerie are specialized in the 
intelligence field is not only due to the lack of training, but also to the almost non-
existent career path for officers and noncommissioned officers in intelligence.  
Furthermore, to be successful, Senegalese gendarmerie intelligence reform should 
take in account the tradeoff between intelligence effectiveness and transparency, as 
discussed in the literature review. Indeed, intelligence activities in Senegal are rarely 
debated by the MPs, the civil society, or the media. Thus, the gendarmerie intelligence 
services should have internal oversight as well as a legislative oversight. Moreover, the 
latter should include an overhaul of the Decree 2006–112 organizing the gendarmerie. 
Therefore, control and oversight mechanisms as well as a new legal framework specific 
to the Senegalese gendarmerie intelligence services should be established.  
The first step to reorganize the intelligence services of the Senegalese National 
Gendarmerie should focus on structure. Intelligence needs to be a major chain of 
command in the gendarmerie organization like Operation, Logistics, and Human 
Resources, which would grant it more importance and more autonomy in the 
gendarmerie. Then, the creation of new services specialized in intelligence, specifically 
Analysis and Operations, is necessary. Given the large territory the gendarmerie covers, 
the DIVDOC is not efficient enough to properly coordinate the intelligence missions of 
the gendarmerie in addition to participating in intelligence operations. The DIVDOC 
would best be the equivalent of the SDAO in French National Gendarmerie, and thus be 
responsible to centralize, analyze, and disseminate the intelligence to the authorities.  
At the same time, a new intelligence unit should be created in charge of 
conducting and coordinating intelligence operations with the gendarmerie. The main 
mission of this unit will be to support every gendarmerie unit that needs to conduct 
special intelligence operations (or operations that require special means). Commensurate 
with this responsibility, this unit should be well funded and equipped with the latest 
technology, enabling it to have greater capabilities of surveillance and information 
 
 56 
acquisition. Then, given the role that the gendarmerie plays, particularly the GIGN in 
counterterrorism operations, it would be useful to establish another service like BLAT to 
be in charge of counterterrorism issues exclusively. Like the French model, the 
Senegalese BLAT would have intelligence and judicial abilities. The Senegalese BLAT 
would work closely with the DIVDOC and the newly created intelligence operation unit 
to guarantee seamless coordination for the gendarmerie’s intelligence missions. Also, 
intelligence officers should be assigned in every territorial legion. They would be in 
charge to coordinate and organize all intelligence activities in the legion to which they are 
assigned. They would also be the contact point for other intelligence services present in 
their legions. All these changes in the gendarmerie intelligence services, however, will be 
possible only if personnel are well trained. 
The second major issue that the Senegalese National Gendarmerie must solve is 
the lack of intelligence training. As proper intelligence training is necessary for personnel 
of the gendarmerie, particularly those serving in the intelligence services, new reforms of 
the intelligence training program should be adopted. First, a training center like the 
CNFRO in the French gendarmerie should be created. This center would be responsible 
for intelligence training of all gendarmerie units. As intelligence courses taught in 
gendarmerie schools are basic and insufficient, the Senegalese CNFRO would conduct 
intelligence training in gendarmerie schools. Also, any gendarmerie personnel who is 
willing to specialize should attend special training at this center, which also would be 
responsible to organize and conduct updates and refresher trainings in intelligence for all 
gendarmerie units. Given the small number of intelligence specialists in the gendarmerie, 
this training center would help the gendarmerie recruit, train, and build a robust 
intelligence career path for its personnel.  
To achieve successful reform of gendarmerie intelligence training, it will be 
necessary to rely on the expertise of Senegal’s allies. In this perspective, France could be 
a major contributor. First, its support is needed for the establishment of a training center 
in the image of CNFRO. Then, the Intelligence Academy in France could make a 
considerable contribution in terms of cooperation for training. Finally, given the similar 
organizational model of the French and Senegalese gendarmeries, a standardization of 
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training programs between the two countries should be very useful for intelligence 
exchanges. In addition, the United States should play a central role in the training of 
gendarmerie intelligence personnel. Indeed, the United States already participates 
actively in the training of the Senegalese armed forces personnel in several fields. 
Regarding intelligence, the United States, through AFRICOM, has also contributed to the 
training of several personnel of the Senegalese armed forces (notably, MINOC-A, 
MIBOC-A).148 In addition, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
program provides funding for U.S. military allies in different security fields.149 These 
programs should benefit the Senegalese gendarmerie to train their personnel properly, 
particularly in the intelligence-related field. Other partner countries such as Spain, Italy, 
or Israel, which are involved in the training of Senegalese armed forces personnel, could 
also participate in the training of the gendarmerie intelligence personnel. 
Finally, control mechanisms should be created for the gendarmerie intelligence 
services. As surveillance and data collection activities are performed by intelligence 
services, it is necessary to establish control mechanisms in order to make them 
accountable. For the Senegalese National Gendarmerie, the oversight should start with 
the creation, within the IIGN, of a control bureau that would be in charge to control 
gendarmerie intelligence activities. This bureau should be under the supervision of the 
commander of the IIGN, which then reports to the High Commander of the Gendarmerie. 
In addition, this internal oversight needs to be followed by legislative oversight. Indeed, 
the Defense and Security Committee of the National Assembly should be more 
interactive with the Senegalese National Gendarmerie. To achieve that interactivity, a 
new legal framework should be established, which defines clearly the role of gendarmerie 
intelligence services as well as their powers and prerogatives. This new legal framework 
should include the new reorganization of the gendarmerie, with the creation of new 
                                                 
148 “The Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course-Africa (MIBOC-A) is a course offered to junior 
military intelligence officers, primarily from north and west Africa,” see U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, 
“Africom Posture Statement: Ward Reports Annual Testimony To Congress,” AFRICOM, March 9, 2010, 
http://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/7245/africom-posture-statement-ward-reports-annual-test. 
149“International Military Education and Training Account Summary,” U.S. Department of State, 




intelligence services, and oversight mechanisms that incorporate civilians. In this context, 
an overhaul of the Decree No. 2006–112 (organizing the Gendarmerie) should be 
undertaken to ensure effectiveness and transparency. Finally, media should continue to 
act as a watchdog by reporting on more topics related to intelligence activities. For better 
media participation, journalists should be invited to learn more about intelligence so they 
can produce relevant and reliable articles or documentaries on intelligence to inform the 
public objectively. 
The implementation of these recommendations should have several impacts. First, 
these measures can significantly improve the effectiveness of the Senegalese gendarmerie 
intelligence services through better reorganization and better management. Given the 
situation in the region, which is characterized by extremism and various security threats, 
these measures should enable the gendarmerie intelligence services to properly fulfill 
their intelligence missions, on which the decisions makers rely. Furthermore, they can 
help the gendarmerie to enhance its cooperation with the other domestic intelligence 
services, as well as with foreign partners, by playing a more important role in intelligence 
cooperation thanks to the quality of its personnel. 
Finally, the implementation of these recommendations should help to consolidate 
Senegalese democracy. As a role model of democracy and stability in the region, Senegal 
can implement these recommendations to help consolidate its position and, at the same 
time, influence other countries to follow its lead. Also, these recommendations will give 
the gendarmerie intelligence services more legitimacy and trust from Senegalese people, 
who will not see them as political tools, but reliable and accountable services working for 
their security.  
In sum, given the difficulties and weaknesses of the intelligence services of the 
gendarmerie, reform is necessary. This reform, which would consist of the creation of 
new services as well as a reorganization of the intelligence services already present in the 
gendarmerie, will necessarily be accompanied by a new legal framework as well as 
mechanisms of control and oversight. The successful implementation of these measures 
would enable the gendarmerie intelligence services to be better organized and better 
prepared to face the new security threats in the region. Of paramount importance in this 
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reform, though, is training. Indeed, the intelligence services of the gendarmerie can only 
be effective if the gendarmes assigned to these services are properly trained, hence the 
importance of giving training reform special attention. 
Moreover, the establishment of control and oversight mechanisms will enable the 
gendarmerie’s intelligence services to act in accordance with laws and regulations. At the 
same time, these mechanisms will make the gendarmerie’s intelligence services more 
efficient and better structured by clearly defining the role, missions, rights, and 
obligations of each service. Finally, this recommended reform will consolidate the 
Senegalese democracy, demonstrating to the Senegalese people and to the other 
countries, that the effectiveness of intelligence services can be achieved with 
transparency in a new, consolidating democracy. 
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Annuaire Français De Relations Internationales, VI. 2006. http://www.afri-
ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/06/afri2005_mathien1.pdf. 
Arrêté Ministériel No. 5457 MINT/CAB. “La Composition, l’Organisation et Les 
Missions de la Cellule de Lutte Anti-Terroriste (CLAT).” [The Composition, 
Organization and Missions of the Anti-Terrorist Cell (CLAT)] Journal Officiel De 
La Republique Du Senegal. 2004. Accessed April 3, 2018. http://www.jo.gouv.sn/
spip.php?article2465. 
Arrêté Ministériel No. 2075 MFA-DIRCEL.”Organisation de l’État-major et du Cabinet 
du Haut Commandant de la Gendarmerie Nationale ainsi que les Attributions des 
Autorités de Commandement.” [Organization of the General Staff and the Office 
of the High Commander of the National Gendarmerie and the Powers of the 
Command Authorities] Journal Officiel De La République Du Sénégal. 2005. 
Accessed April 2, 2018, http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article3420. 
Assemblée Nationale. “Commissions.” Accessed April 18, 2018. http://www.assemblee-
nationale.sn/xml-1411131120-page-rub30-int.xml?p=active30. 
Boillot, Floriane, and Florian Garbay. “En Planque!” Ministère De L’Intérieur. Accessed 
May 26, 2018. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Actualites/Dossiers/En-planque. 
Bruneau, Thomas C., and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei. “Intelligence in the Developing 
Democracies: The Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by Loch K. Johnson, 757–773. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Bruneau Thomas C., and Kenneth R. Dombroski. “Reforming Intelligence: The 
Challenge of Control in New Democracies.” Center for Civil-Military Relations. 
June 4, 2014. Calhoun. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41971. 
Caparini, Marina. “Controling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic 
States.” In Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue 
Elephants, edited by Hans Born and Marina Caparini, 3–24. Aldershot, England: 
Ashgate, 2007.  
 
 62 
Carter, Jeremy G., and David L. Carter. “Law Enforcement Intelligence: Implications for 
Self-radicalized Terrorism.” Police Practice and Research 13, no. 2 (2012): 138–
54. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2011.596685. 
Chichignoud, Christelle. “La Gendarmerie, Force De Sécurité Au Service De La Nation.” 
[The Gendarmerie, Security Force at the Service of the Nation] Hérodote116, no. 
1 (2005): 85–86. https://doi.org/10.3917/her.116.0082. 
Chirac, Jacques. Décret No. 2002–889 du 15 mai 2002. “Attributions du Ministre de 
l’Intérieur, de la Sécurité Intérieure et des Libertés Locales.” ,” [Responsibilities 
of the Minister of the Interior, Internal Security and Local Liberties] Journal 
Officiel de la République de France. 2002. Accessed April 5, 2018. 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005633083&dateTexte=20100603 
Chopin, Olivier, and Benjamin Oudet. Renseignement et Sécurité. ,” [Intelligence and 
Security] Malakoff, Paris, France: Armand Colin, 2016. 
Chopin, Olivier. “Intelligence Reform and the Transformation of the State: The End of a 
French Exception.” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 541. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1326100. 
Commission De La Défense Nationale et Des Forces Armées de L’Assemble Nationale. 
Compte Rendu no. 07 du Mardi 10 Octobre 2017. Séance de 17 heure. National 
Defense Commission And Armed Forces Of The National Assembly Accessed 
May 2, 2018. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/cr-cdef/17-18/c1718007.asp. 
Denécé, Eric. “France. The Intelligence Services Historical and Cultural Context.” In The 
Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures, edited by Bob de Graaf and James 
M. Nyce, with Chelsea Locke. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.  
DCAF Intelligence Working Group. “Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight-a 
Practitioner’s View.” Occasional paper 3, 2003. https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/
files/publications/documents/op03_intelligence-practice.pdf. 
Diouf, Abdou. Loi No. 84–62. “Organisation Générale des Forces Armées.” General 
Organization of the Armed Forces Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal. 
1984. 
Edmunds, Timothy. “Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change 
in Serbia after Milošević.” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 1 (2008): 25–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701760315. 
Esparza, Diego, and Thomas C. Bruneau. Closing the Gap between Law Enforcement and 
National Security Intelligence: Comparative Approaches. Unpublished.  
 
 63 
Freedom House. “Senegal.” January 16, 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2018/senegal. 
Forces Publiques “Société Nationale de L’histoire et du Patrimoine de la Gendarmerie 
(SNHPG), Histoire Gendarmerie.” [National Society Of The History And 
Heritage Of The Gendarmerie (SNHPG), History Gendarmerie] Accessed April 
29, 2018. https://www.force-publique.net/index.php?page=3&ch=3. 
Gendarmerie. “Centre National De Formation Au Renseignement Opérationnel 
(CNFRO).” [National Training Center for Operational Intelligence (CNFRO)] 
Accessed May 16, 2018. https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/cegn/Autres-
pages/Centres/Centre-national-de-formation-au-renseignement-operationnel-
CNFRO. 
Gendarmerie Nationale. “Centre National De Formation Au Renseignement Opérationnel 
(CNFRO).” ),” [National Training Center for Operational Intelligence (CNFRO)] 
Ministère de L’Intérieur. Accessed May 16, 2018. 
https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/cegn/Autres-pages/Centres/Centre-
national-de-formation-au-renseignement-operationnel-CNFRO. 
. Directive Portant Emploi des Escadrons de Surveillance et d’Intervention. 
[Employment Directive of the Surveillance and Intervention Squadrons] No. 2285 
/2/HC/EM/OPS/DAS. Dakar: Government of Senegal, 2012. 
. “L’Entre-Deux-Guerres.” [Between Two Wars] Ministère de L’Intérieur. 
Accessed April 4, 2018. https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Notre-
institution/Notre-histoire/La-gendarmerie-de-sa-naissance-a-aujourd-hui/L-entre-
deux-guerres. 
. “Garde Républicaine.” [Republican Guard] Ministère de L’Intérieur. Accessed 
April 4, 2018. https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/garde-republicaine/
Decouverte/Histoire. 
. “La Gendarmerie Départementale.” [The Departmental Gendarmerie] Ministère 
de L’Intérieur. Accessed April 5, 2018. 
https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Notre-institution/Notre-histoire/La-
gendarmerie-de-sa-naissance-a-aujourd-hui/La-gendarmerie-departementale. 
. “La Gendarmerie, Héritière des Maréchaussées.” Ministère de L’Intérieur. [The 






. “Lors de La Restauration.” [During the Restoration] Accessed April 4, 2018. 
https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Notre-institution/Notre-histoire/La-
gendarmerie-de-sa-naissance-a-aujourd-hui/Lors-de-la-restauration. 
. “La Gendarmerie Mobile.” Ministère de L’Intérieur. Accessed April 5, 2018. 
https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Notre-institution/Notre-histoire/La-
gendarmerie-de-sa-naissance-a-aujourd-hui/La-gendarmerie-mobile. 
. “Pendant L’Occupation.” [During the Occupation] Ministère de L’Intérieur. 
Accessed April 5, 2018. https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Notre-
institution/Notre-histoire/La-gendarmerie-de-sa-naissance-a-aujourd-hui/Pendant-
l-Occupation. 
Government of the French Republic. “L’Académie du Renseignement.” [Intelligence 
Academy] Académie du Renseignement. Accessed May 16, 2018. 
http://www.academie-renseignement.gouv.fr/academie.html. 
. “La Coordination Nationale du Renseignement.” [Coordination of National 
Intelligence] L’Académie du Renseignement. Accessed April 24, 2018. 
http://www.academie-renseignement.gouv.fr/coordination.html. 
. “L’Encadrement Juridique de L’Activité de Renseignement.” [Legal Framework 
of Intelligence Activity] L’académie du Renseignement. Accessed April 22, 2018. 
http://www.academie-renseignement.gouv.fr/encadrement-juridique.html. 
. Livre Blanc, Défense et Sécurité Nationale, 2013. [White Paper, Defense and 
National Security] Paris: Government of the French Republic, 2013. 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/206186/2286591/file/Livre-blanc-
sur-la-Defense-et-la-Securite-nationale%202013.pdf 
.”Projet de Loi De Finances Pour 2017: Securités : Gendarmerie Nationale.” 
[Draft Finance Law For 2017: Security: National Gendarmerie] Sénat. Accessed 
May 14, 2018. http://www.senat.fr/rap/a16-142-11/a16-142-118.html. 
. “Renforcer L’Efficacité du Renseignement Intérieur.” [Strengthening the 
effectiveness of domestic intelligence] Sénat. Accessed May 15, 2018. 
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r15-036/r15-0366.html. 
. “Les Services Spécialisés de Renseignement.” [Specialized Intelligence 
Services] L’Académie du Renseignement. Accessed May 28, 2018. 
http://www.academie-renseignement.gouv.fr/services.html. 
Government of the Republic of Senegal. “Budget 2018 de la Police et de la Gendarmerie 





. “La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST).” [The Directorate of 
Territorial Surveillance] Accessed April 2, 2018. 
http://www.policenationale.gouv.sn/dirsurveillance.html. 
. “Entrée en Vigueur de la Loi Sécurité Intérieure et Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme.” 
[Application of the Law For Domestic Security and Fight against Terrorism] 
Ministère de l’Intérieur. Accessed May 3, 2018. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Le-
ministre/Communiques/Entree-en-vigueur-de-la-loi-securite-interieure-et-lutte-
contre-le-terrorisme. 
Haberbusch, Benoît. “Renseignement et Guerre d’Algérie, Le Rôle de La Gendarmerie 
Mobile.” [Intelligence and the Algerian War, The Role of the Gendarmerie] 
Revue Historique des Armées 247 (2007): 60–69. http://rha.revues.org/1863. 
Herman, Michael. “Intelligence Power in Peace and War.” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
Herodote. “26 Février 1885 La Conférence de Berlin Livre le Congo au Roi des Belges.” 
Last modified August 1, 2016. Accessed March 27, 2018. 
https://www.herodote.net/26_fevrier_1885-evenement-18850226.php. 
Hewitt, Steve. The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism on the Home 
Front Since 9/11. London, UK: Continuum, 2011, 4. 
IGE. “Inspection Générale D’état du Sénégal.” [General Inspectorate of the State of 
Senegal] Accessed April 18, 2018. http://www.ige.sn/. 
Journal Offiel de la République du Sénégal. “Code de Procedure Pénale.” Dakar: 
Government of Senegal, 1965. 
Journaleuse. “Médias Et Secret Défense: Petites Fuites Et Grandes Oreilles.” Accessed 
May 29, 2018. https://journaleuse.com/2014/03/30/medias-secret-defense-petites-
fuites-grandes-oreilles/. 
 Lagneau, Laurent. “Les Missions des Brigades de Gendarmerie Vont être Allégées pour 
Favoriser le Contact avec la Population.” [The Missions of the Brigades of the 
Gendarmerie Will be Lightened to Promote the Contact with the Population] 
Opex 360. October 28, 2016. http://www.opex360.com/2016/10/28/les-missions-
des-brigades-de-gendarmerie-vont-etre-allegees-pour-favoriser-le-contact-avec-
la-population/. 
Légifrance. “Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, Article 12.” [The 





Libération. “Combien De Temps Aura Duré 68?” January 19, 2018. 
http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/01/19/combien-de-temps-aura-dure-
68_1623845. 
Lizurey, Richard. Gendarmerie Nationale, Les Soldats De La Loi. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires De France, 2006. 
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2008. 
Mandraud, Isabelle. “Guerre Sourde Entre Gendarmes et Policiers Sur Le 
Renseignement.” [Deaf War Between Police And Gendarmes On Intelligence] Le 
Monde, September 21, 2009. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/09/21/
guerre-sourde-entre-gendarmes-et-policiers-sur-le-
renseignement_1243051_3224.html. 
Matei, Florina Cristiana. “A Plea for Effective Intelligence in a Democracy: The View of 
an Outsider.” In A War of Mind, Intelligence, Intelligence Services and Strategic 
Knowledge in the 21st Century, edited by George Christian Maior, 281–309. 
Bucharest: RAO Publishing, 2010. 
Matei, Florina Cristiana, and Thomas Bruneau. “Intelligence Reform in New 
Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress.” Democratization 18, no. 
3 (2011): 602–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.586257. 
. “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies.” International 
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 4 (2011): 656–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2011.598784. 
Matei, Florina Cristiana, and Andrés De Castro García. “Chilean Intelligence after 
Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy.” International Journal 
of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 2 (2017): 357–360. https://doi.org/
10.1080/08850607.2017.1263530. 
Matei, Florina Cristiana, and Damien Van Puyvelde. “Intelligence and Democracy” 
(Class discussion NS3155, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 
2007). 
Ministère de l’Intérieur (Senegal). “Organisation de La Police Nationale.” [Organization 
of the National Police] Accessed April 3, 2018. http://www.interieur.gouv.sn/
securite-publique/organisation-de-la-police-nationale. 
Naizot, Frédéric. “Des Gendarmes au Top dans La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme.” 





National Police of the French Republic.”La Gendarmerie Nationale 2017: Histoire, 
Missions, Effectifs, Recrutement.” [The National Gendarmerie 2017: History, 
Missions, Workforce, Recruitment] Police-Nationale. January 2018. 
http://www.police-nationale.net/gendarmerie/#direction-generale. 
Pennetier, Marine. “Le Renseignement Militaire Français S’ouvre à La Société Civile.” 
[French Military Intelligence Opens to Civil Society] Capital.fr. March 23, 2017. 
https://www.capital.fr/entreprises-marches/le-renseignement-militaire-francais-s-
ouvre-a-la-societe-civile-1216359. 
Plateforme des A.N.E. du Sénégal. “Mieux Nous Connaître.” [About Us] November 5, 
2008. https://acteursnonetatiquesn.wordpress.com/about/. 
Plattner, Marc F., Andreas Schedler, and Larry Diamond. The Self-Restraining State: 
Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1999. 
Poncet, Guerric. “Loi sur Le Renseignement: Bilan D’une Folle Semaine.” [Intelligence 
Act: Review of a Crazy Week] Le Point. April 25, 2015. http://www.lepoint.fr/
chroniqueurs-du-point/guerric-poncet/loi-sur-le-renseignement-bilan-d-une-folle-
semaine-17-04-2015-1922401_506.php. 
Pressafrik. “Assemblée Nationale: « Est-ce Qu’il Y a Des écoutes Téléphoniques Sur 
Certaines Personnalités Sénégalaises ? », (député).” [National Assembly: “Are 
There Any Telephone Taping of Some Senegalese Personalities? ,” (deputy)] 
Accessed April 18, 2018. https://www.pressafrik.com/DIRECT-Assemblee-
nationale-Est-ce-qu-il-y-a-des-ecoutes-telephoniques-sur-certaines-personnalites-
senegalaises--depute_a174015.html. 
RFI Afrique. “Sénégal: L’auteur De «Pour L’honneur De La Gendarmerie» Mis Aux 
Arrêts.” [Senegal: The Author Of “For The Honor Of The Gendarmerie” 
Arrested] August 14, 2014. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140814-senegal-auteur-
honneur-gendarmerie-mis-arrets-colonel-ndaw-abdoulaye-fall-casamance. 
Rogez, Olivier. “2012, Année Chaotique Pour Le Mali – RFI.” [ 2012, Chaotic Year For 
Mali] RFI Afrique. December 26, 2012. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20121226-2012-
mali-chaos-aqmi-nord-diarra-sanogo-toure-traore. 
Sady, Sidy. La Gendarmerie Nationale Sénégalaise : Son Rôle dans la Consolidation de 
l’État. [The National Gendarmerie of Senegal: Its Role in the Consolidation of the 
State] Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2011. 
Sall, Macky. Loi No. 2016–33 “Services de Renseignement.” [Intelligence Services] 




Sane, Arfang Saloum. “La Gendarmerie Sénégalaise Dotée D’Unités De Scanner 
Mobiles.” [The Senegalese Gendarmerie equipped with Mobile Scanner Units]La 
Voie De Bargny. May 13, 2016, http://www.lavoiedebargny.com/la-gendarmerie-
senegalaise-dotee-dunites-de-scanner-mobiles/. 
Sarkozy, Nicolas. Arrêté du 31 mars 2006 Pris pour l’Application de l’Article 33 de la 
Loi No. 2006–64 du 23 Janvier 2006 Relative à la Lutte contre le Terrorisme et 
Portant Dispositions Diverses Relatives à la Sécurité et aux Contrôles Frontaliers. 
[Order of March 31, 2006 Taken for the Application of Article 33 of Law No. 
2006–64 of January 23, 2006 Relating to the Fight Against Terrorism and Various 
Provisions Relating to Security and Border Controls] Journal Officiel de la 
République de France. 2006. Accessed April 5, 2018. 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=
JORFTEXT000000456295 
. Loi No. 2009–971 du 3 août 2009. “La Gendarmerie Nationale (1).” Journal 
Officiel de la République de France. 2009. Accessed April 5, 2018. 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=
JORFTEXT000020954146&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id. 
Scheier, Fred. “Fighting The Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-Led Operations.” 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009. 
https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/
OP16_SCF_Fighting%2520the%2520Pre-eminent%2520threats.pdf. 
. “The Need for Efficient and Legitimate Intelligence.” In Democratic Control of 
Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, edited by H. Born and Marina 
Caparini. pages??? Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007. 
Senghor, Léopold S. Décret No. 74–571. “Règlement sur l’Emploi et le Service de la 
Gendarmerie.” [Regulation on the Employment and Service of the Gendarmerie] 
Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal. 1974. URL?? 
Seneweb News. “Tuerie de Diyabougou à Bakel entre Maliens et Burkinabe: Deux Corps 
Burkinabés Inhumés à Diyabougou, Huit Autres En Attente.” [Killing of 
Diyabougou in Bakel between Malians and Burkinabe: Two bodies buried in 




SenXibar. “Aïda Mbodj et Les écoutes Téléphoniques.” [Aïda Mbodj and The Phone 




Tetard, Marie. “Renseignement Français. Où En Est-on ?.” [French intelligence. Where 
are we?] Fondation IFRAP. Accessed April 24, 2018. http://www.ifrap.org/etat-
et-collectivites/le-renseignement-francais-ou-en-est. 
Trujillo, Elsa. “Loi Renseignement : Une Première «boîte Noire» Activée Pour Surveiller 
Les Communications.” [Intelligence Law: First “Black Box” Activated To 
Monitor Communications] Le Figaro. November 14, 2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/
secteur/high-tech/2017/11/14/32001-20171114ARTFIG00202-loi-renseignement-
une-premiere-boite-noire-a-ete-activee.php. 
U.S. Department of State. “International Military Education and Training Account 
Summary.” Accessed May 26, 2018. https://www.state.gov/t/pm/sa/sat/
c14562.htm. 
Valls, Manuel. Arrêté du 6 décembre 2013 Modifiant l’Arrêté du 12 août 2013. 
“Organisation de la Direction Générale de la Gendarmerie Nationale.” Journal 




Van Puyvelde, Damien. “Intelligence, Democratic Accountability, and the Media in 
France.” Democracy and Security10, no. 3 (2014): 292. https://doi.org/10.1080/
17419166.2014.946018. 
Videlin, Jean-Christophe. Droit De La Défense Nationale. [National Defense Law] 
Brussels: Bruylant, 2014. 
Wade, Abdoulaye. Décret No. 2003–388. “Création d’une Cellule de Lutte Anti-
terrorisme.” Journal Officiel De La Republique Du Senegal. 2003. Accessed April 
3, 2018. http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article798. 
. Décret No. 2001–312. “Création de la Section de Recherches.” Journal Officiel 
de la République du Sénégal. 2001.  
. Décret No. 2003–292. “Organisation du Ministère de l’Intérieur.” Journal 
Officiel De La Republique Du Senegal. 2003. Accessed April 3, 2018. 
http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article770. 
. Décret No. 2006–112. “Organisation du Haut Commandement de la 
Gendarmerie Nationale, ainsi que des Attributions des Autorités de 
Commandement.” Journal Officiel De La Republique Du Senegal. 2006. 




Watts, Larry L. “Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania.” In 
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, edited 
by H. Born and Marina Caparini, 47–64. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007. 
 
 71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
